The ‘war windfall’ at home

The ‘war windfall’ of the title is the word of the gas export tax campaign, not a finding of this article: the Australian Greens headed their 3 July 2026 release ‘$18 billion gas war windfall’ ¹⁸. On Tuesday 29 September 2026, the day the Reserve Bank raised the cash rate target to 4.60 per cent ²⁵, Independent ACT Senator David Pocock posted a video to Facebook. Its caption reads: ‘Why is it always households getting stung with increased costs while massive multinationals bank wartime profits? Why aren’t the major parties talking about a windfall profits tax or backing the push for a 25% gas export tax [emoji]?! There is more we can and must do to stop price gouging and get a fair return from the export of our resources.’ ¹

THE RORT reads ‘bank’ in that sentence as a verb: to take in and keep. The caption does not name the banking sector, and this article is not about the banks. Only the caption is quoted here; the video’s spoken words were not transcribed ¹.

The Reserve Bank’s statement that day said inflation remained elevated and that some of the upside risks it had flagged in August were materialising: ‘The conflict in the Middle East has broadened and global energy prices are now much higher than had been assumed in the August forecasts.’ ²⁵ The caption does not mention the rate rise, and this article does not examine rate rises or retail energy bills.

This article sets the public record beside the caption. It is not a verdict on the post. Three things stand out. The war shows in the government department’s forecasts for 2026-27 LNG export earnings, as export revenue rather than profit or tax ²²⁴. The producers’ own half-year accounts point in different directions: Woodside’s underlying profit rose 7 per cent, Santos’s profit after tax fell 19 per cent and INPEX’s profit attributable to owners rose 17.7 per cent while its profit before tax was little changed ³⁴⁵. And at home, east coast wholesale gas prices did not follow world prices up ⁹; fuel prices did rise ¹¹¹².

The caption speaks of ‘wartime profits’ and a ‘windfall profits tax’ ¹. The article makes no allegation of wrongdoing against any company. THE RORT publishes its questions at the end, and answers will be added as they arrive.

01The caption

The caption makes three claims. The first is about who bears the cost: households, ‘always’. The second is about who gains: ‘massive multinationals’, in ‘wartime profits’. The third is about policy: that the major parties are not talking about a windfall profits tax, or backing a 25% gas export tax ¹. The caption does not name a company.

Why is it always households getting stung with increased costs while massive multinationals bank wartime profits?

The rest of this article takes each part in turn, using the department’s forecasts, the companies’ own reports, the Budget’s tax figures and the ABS and AEMO price data. It does not rule on the words ‘price gouging’: the record used here is about export earnings, profits, tax and prices, not about how any price was set.

02The forecasts: revenue, not profit

The department’s own numbers are where the war shows first. Its latest Resources and Energy Quarterly, the September 2026 edition published on 2 October 2026, puts LNG export earnings at $55.4 billion in 2025-26 in nominal terms, below the $64.6 billion of 2024-25, and forecasts $70.4 billion nominal in 2026-27 (its Table 6.1 gives 55,361, 64,625 and 70,444 million). In 2026-27 dollars, the department’s real-terms measure, the figures are $57.2 billion for 2025-26, $69.5 billion for 2024-25 and $70.4 billion for 2026-27 (57,245, 69,457 and 70,444 million). The edition says export earnings are forecast ‘to rise from $57 billion in 2025-26 to $70 billion in 2026-27, before easing to $42 billion by 2030-31 (in real terms)’, and that earnings forecasts for 2026-27 ‘have been revised up by about $3 billion from the June 2026 REQ reflecting higher oil prices’ ²⁴. The June edition had put 2025-26 at $59.4 billion nominal ². On THE RORT’s calculation the September figure is $4.1 billion lower (59,423 less 55,361 million), and THE RORT has not identified the department’s stated reason for that change.

THE RORT’s calculation from the September figures: the 2026-27 forecast of $70.4 billion is $15.1 billion above the 2025-26 figure of $55.4 billion and $5.8 billion above the $64.6 billion of 2024-25, all in nominal dollars (70,444, 55,361 and 64,625 million). In real terms, in 2026-27 dollars, it is $13.2 billion above 2025-26 and $1.0 billion above 2024-25 (70,444 less 57,245, and 70,444 less 69,457 million). The $20 billion is the size of the June revision to the department’s forecast, not the size of a rise on last year.

The upgrade is wider than gas. In the June edition all resource and energy exports were revised up by $22 billion for 2025-26 and $42 billion for 2026-27, to $405 billion and a forecast $416 billion, driven, the department said, by Middle East energy prices and gold. Thermal coal’s 2026-27 upgrade in the June edition was $3 billion ². The September edition puts 2025-26 at $403 billion and forecasts $422 billion for 2026-27, ‘an upward revision of over $6 billion from the June 2026 REQ’. In that edition thermal coal export earnings are forecast to fall from $31 billion in 2026-27 to $26 billion in 2027-28 and $24 billion in 2030-31, in real terms ²⁴.

In its June edition the department says the conflict ‘has flipped LNG markets from expected oversupply to expected undersupply for the next 2-3 years’, and forecasts the Japan Korea Marker LNG price at over US$16 per MMBtu in 2026, declining to around US$11 by 2028 ². In its September edition the department says JKM prices ‘rose from around US$16/MMBtu in June 2026 to around US$25/MMBtu in late September’ ²⁴.

The department’s June edition states two limits itself. Its main forecasts assumed the blockade ended in late June, an assumption it calls ‘not a view on the pathway the conflict will take’. And the export gain is gross: ‘The REQ does not account for the net effect on Australia from increased import prices, for example oil and its derivatives, such as diesel.’ Its scenarios, which are not forecasts, show how sensitive the numbers are. If Hormuz trade were disrupted until the end of June 2026, resource and energy export earnings would rise by nearly $8 billion in 2025-26 and $30 billion in 2026-27. If it were disrupted until the end of August, 2026-27 earnings would be $37 billion higher, at $429 billion. The department does not say in Box 1.1 what the $30 billion and $37 billion are measured against; on THE RORT’s calculation, $429 billion is $13 billion above its main forecast of $416 billion ². The September edition’s forecasts use ‘a “central” scenario that assumes oil supply is sufficient to meet demand without sharp price rises before Middle East flows pick up and build to pre-conflict levels’, and it says its forecasts ‘remain highly uncertain’ ²⁴.

Source note. The LNG export earnings in this section, the PRRT ratios below and the chart are from the department’s September 2026 edition of the Resources and Energy Quarterly, published on 2 October 2026 and read directly ²⁴. The June edition put 2025-26 at $59.4 billion nominal and forecast $67.6 billion nominal for 2026-27 ². The $20 billion, $22 billion, $42 billion, $405 billion and $416 billion above are the June edition’s own figures.

03The producers’ own half-years

Woodside, all figures in US dollars, reported a profit after tax of US$1,672 million for the half to 30 June 2026, up 27 per cent. That figure includes an additional Pluto PRRT deferred tax asset of US$596 million before tax and US$417 million after tax, which Woodside says reflects ‘increased expected utilisation of available PRRT deductions driven by the higher pricing environment’. Underlying profit rose 7 per cent, from US$1,247 million to US$1,334 million. Revenue rose 13 per cent to US$7,446 million, and the realised price rose 20 per cent to US$74.0 a barrel of oil equivalent, which Woodside attributes to stronger commodity prices amid global supply disruptions, together with the realisation of premiums. Its report says: ‘During the half, the Middle East conflict disrupted the global supply of LNG and oil resulting in strengthening commodity prices and an increase in customer demand for products.’ ³

Woodside’s interim dividend was US$1,084 million, 57 US cents a share fully franked against 53 cents a year earlier, which Woodside says represents 80 per cent of underlying profit ³.

Santos, also in US dollars, reported a profit after tax of US$355 million for the same half, down 19 per cent from US$439 million (THE RORT’s calculation from the two figures Santos reports). Its underlying profit was US$397 million, against US$508 million. Santos says first-half earnings and cash flow ‘reflect one-off commissioning costs and cargo timing’. Its presentation says ‘Global JCC above $100/bbl into Q2 2026’ (JCC is an oil price index) and that ‘Three-month lagging pricing mechanisms carry this into 2H 2026’; it describes its LNG as ‘priced on oil with a three-month lag’ and says approximately 80 per cent of its contracted position is linked to JCC and oil indexation. THE RORT found no mention of the Middle East conflict in the presentation. Its first-half realised LNG price was US$10.95 per mmBtu. It declared an unfranked interim dividend of US 11.6 cents a share, or US$377 million ⁴.

INPEX, which is listed in Japan and operates the Ichthys project, reported first-half 2026 profit attributable to owners up ¥39.6 billion, or 17.7 per cent, to ¥263.1 billion. Its profit before tax was little changed, down ¥0.6 billion, or 0.1 per cent, to ¥644.3 billion, and its revenue fell ¥48.3 billion, or 4.6 per cent, to ¥1,000.4 billion; its income tax expense fell ¥42.8 billion, or 10.7 per cent, to ¥359.7 billion ⁵. It raised its full-year forecast of profit attributable to owners to ¥510.0 billion, from a range of ¥350 billion to ¥450 billion, ‘mainly reflecting the stable production of the Ichthys Project and revisions to its assumptions for crude oil prices and foreign exchange rates’ ⁵.

So the companies’ own accounts show one producer up 7 per cent on an underlying basis, one down 19 per cent on reported profit, and one up 17.7 per cent in yen on profit attributable to owners, with its profit before tax little changed. The figures are in US dollars for Woodside and Santos and in yen for INPEX, and they are not added together here.

04Tax: PRRT and company tax

The petroleum resource rent tax, PRRT, raised $1,416 million in cash receipts in 2025-26, against a Budget figure of $1,400 million, and $1,661 million in accrual revenue, against a Budget figure of $1,670 million ⁷. The ABC reported that PRRT raised $1.42 billion in 2024-25, apparently on a cash basis ¹³.

PRRT is a profit-based tax on petroleum projects, oil included. THE RORT’s calculation: set against the $55.4 billion of LNG export earnings in 2025-26 (September 2026 edition), $1,416 million is 2.6 per cent and $1,661 million is 3.0 per cent. That ratio is not the total government take. Company tax, royalties and excise also apply, and PRRT covers oil as well as LNG ⁷²⁴.

Woodside says in its own tax account, a company self-report not audited here, that its effective income tax rate on reported Australian profits was 29.5 per cent in 2025. Woodside says it paid about A$2 billion in Australian taxes, royalties and levies in 2025, after A$4.1 billion in 2024 and ‘a record A$5 billion in 2023’, and that it has paid approximately A$23 billion of PRRT across its merged portfolio over time ⁶.

In the half to June 2026, Woodside paid US$825 million in income tax and PRRT in cash, against US$782 million a year earlier. In its income statement PRRT was a net benefit of US$305 million, against an income tax expense of US$667 million, on profit before tax of US$2,035 million ³.

Treasury officials told the Senate committee that after the Ukraine price spike, oil and gas producers ran down accumulated tax losses: ‘a run-down of a lot of the accumulated losses in the corporate tax system by oil and gas producers, and that’s what’s led to that increase in tax paid’. They also said further price pass-through ‘would also directly translate through to higher corporate tax paid.’ This is as quoted in the Greens’ additional comments to the committee’s report ⁸.

The committee is the Senate Select Committee on the Taxation of Gas Resources. Its chair is Senator Steph Hodgins-May (Australian Greens) and its deputy chair Senator Varun Ghosh (Labor). Its other members are Senators Lisa Darmanin (Labor), Susan McDonald (LNP), David Pocock (Independent) and Dean Smith (Liberal). It tabled its report on 7 May 2026. The committee ‘has not been able to reach agreement on a set of recommendations’, so the views of members are set out in additional comments. It also ‘finds that lack of timely, transparent entity-level data continues to make it difficult for industry, government and the community to have a shared understanding of revenue, profits, and PRRT liabilities’ ⁸.

05At home: wholesale gas fell, fuel rose then eased

East coast wholesale gas did not follow world prices up during the war. AEMO recorded an average of $10.61 per gigajoule in the March quarter 2026, with March itself at $9.22, a four-year low. The June quarter averaged $9.08 per gigajoule, ‘lower than Q2 2025, which averaged $12.36/GJ’, and AEMO calls it the lowest average for any quarter since Q2 2021 ⁹. THE RORT’s calculation: $9.08 is 26.5 per cent below $12.36.

What an exporter could get instead was far higher. In the June quarter the ACCC’s LNG netback, the export-parity price, was $20.84 per gigajoule against the AEMO domestic average of $9.08, 2.3 times as much on THE RORT’s calculation, rounded to one decimal place. AEMO says international LNG spot prices were at their highest level since February 2023 ⁹.

The ACCC’s June 2026 interim report, published on 10 July, says: ‘the disruptions have so far not resulted in a material impact on east coast gas prices.’ The ACCC says the exception is commodity-linked contracts, 12 per cent of 2026 supply, whose average estimated price rose from $11.86 per gigajoule in December 2025 to $16.85 in April 2026 ¹⁰. Producer and retailer contract prices for 2026 supply stayed in the $13 to $15 per gigajoule range seen since the 2022-23 crisis. That contract data runs to 31 March 2026, mostly before the war, so it is not a like-for-like comparison with the June quarter spot prices ¹⁰.

Fuel is a different story. The ABS reports that automotive fuel prices rose 32.8 per cent in March 2026 and fell 7.0 per cent in April. The April fall ‘includes the halving of the fuel excise on 1 April’, and fuel was still 23.5 per cent higher than in February, before the impact of the Middle East conflict. It was up 18.6 per cent in the year to April, having been down 7.2 per cent on the year in February, before the war ¹¹. In June fuel fell 10.9 per cent: ‘Lower world oil prices as a result of some stabilisation in the Middle East in June contributed to fuel prices falling 10.9 per cent in the month.’ Excise relief had lowered fuel in April and May. In July fuel rose 7.5 per cent in the month, which the ABS put down to higher world oil prices and the partial unwinding of the fuel excise relief. The transport group, which includes fuel, was up only 1.6 per cent in the year to July, after 0.1 per cent in the year to June ¹². In August automotive fuel rose 14.8 per cent in the month, after 7.5 per cent in July. The ABS put the August rise down to higher world oil prices and the unwinding of the remainder of the federal government’s fuel excise relief measures in August, and the transport group was up 5.6 per cent over the year to August ²²²³.

The caption does not say which household costs it means. Of the prices examined here, the war-linked rises were in fuel and in the commodity-linked gas contracts that make up 12 per cent of 2026 supply, not in the AEMO wholesale average ^9101112. Fuel is an oil product. This article does not trace pump prices to gas producers, and nothing in the record used here does. It does not examine rate rises or retail energy bills; the Reserve Bank’s statement of 29 September said that ‘Higher fuel prices have partially been passed through to prices of other goods and services’ ²⁵.

06The levy studied and dropped, and the reasons

The ABC reported on 20 March 2026 that a document from the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet asked Treasury to model ‘new levy options’ on windfall gas and thermal coal profits, stating: ‘Energy producers should not benefit from high international prices at the expense of domestic customers’ ¹⁴. A later ABC article, on 10 May, reported that the Prime Minister ‘killed off the move, concerned it could upset the trading partners Australia is relying on for fuel’. That is the reporter’s characterisation, not a government quote ¹³.

The ABC reported on 10 May, two days before the 12 May Budget, that the government ‘refused calls for a broader 25 per cent tax on gas exports’. The ABC reported that Treasurer Jim Chalmers said the government was not proposing any changes to the existing tax arrangements, and quoted him: ‘I know that people would like us to go further but there are good reasons to prioritise fuel supply and gas reservation.’ ¹³ On 18 June, after both the document the ABC reported on 20 March and the 10 May report, the Treasurer said, as ABC 7.30 excerpted on 20 July: ‘When it comes to arrangements around gas taxes, that’s not something that we’ve been working on.’ ¹⁵

The government’s alternative is the gas reservation scheme. It was set on 7 May 2026 at ‘equivalent to 20 per cent of exports, from 1 July 2027’, and respects export contracts entered into before 22 December 2025. Senator Pocock’s additional comments recommended a reservation mechanism alongside the export tax, not instead of it ⁸. The ministers’ joint media release of 10 September 2026 gives later dates: the licence application process is to commence from 1 January 2027 and the Domestic Supply Obligation from 1 January 2028 ²⁰. On that date the legislation was at exposure-draft stage ²⁰.

The government’s reasons are on the record. Prime Minister Albanese said on 29 April: ‘The middle of a global fuel crisis is the worst possible time to jeopardise these partnerships, or the investment that underpins them. This is why I can confirm that the budget will not undermine existing contracts on gas exports’, and ‘Australia is a reliable supplier of energy’. SBS reported on 24 April that he said gas companies ‘pay around about $22 billion’ and that ‘you need to acknowledge the tens of billions of dollars of investment that occurs in order to have that gas extracted’ ¹⁵. THE RORT has not sourced the $22 billion figure independently ¹⁵.

Resources Minister Madeleine King said on ABC RN Breakfast on 24 April that ‘it’s only in the universe of the Greens Party and their friends that they can say that spending hundreds of billions of dollars across the country could be considered in any way free. It’s clearly an absurd proposition’, and added: ‘And to be frank, I’m mystified as to how they get away with such tosh.’ In the same interview she said: ‘we’ve got to remember what those billions of dollars of investment has delivered for the Australian people and what is, what we get out of it. And one of the things is a domestic gas supply.’ SBS reported part of the interview the same day, the passage on investment ¹⁵¹⁶.

In the committee’s additional comments, the Labor senators recommended that ‘After the current Middle East energy crisis has passed and following finalisation of the government gas market review and gas reservation design, the Treasury or the Productivity Commission evaluate the reform proposals to the inquiry’, aiming to avoid ‘damaging vital regional relationships or undermining Australia’s energy and national security’. The Coalition senators, Susan McDonald and Dean Smith, recommended ‘no arbitrary taxation such as a windfall levy on gas exports’, taking the view that ‘Australia needs an increased tax take, not an increased tax rate’, and pointing to the global energy crisis and to what they called a rushed process, with 24 hours to respond to the Chair’s draft ⁸.

If you were putting that on top of PRRT, if you were putting it on top of corporate income tax, I’m not sure how any project would survive.

Woodside’s chief financial officer, Graham Tiver, told the committee on 24 April 2026 what he thought an export tax on top of existing taxes would do, in the words above ¹⁷. ‘Would kill projects’ was the ABC’s headline paraphrase, not Woodside’s words. The committee itself did not settle the question: it ‘notes the Prime Minister’s stated concerns about timing and invites the government to reconsider this issue following the resolution of the current conflict in Iran’ ⁸.

Every recorded 2026 division on a 25 per cent gas export tax found in the Senate Journals and House Votes was lost: in the Senate on 12 March (13 to 35 on the Greens’ 25 per cent amendment, and 13 to 34 on Senator Pocock’s amendment to it), 31 March (10 to 26), 1 April (12 to 32), 29 June (10 to 33) and 12 August (11 to 30), and in the House on 2 June (9 to 71, where the government’s members voted it down and the Coalition did not vote) ²¹.

These are the stated reasons, reported as stated. The record used here does not show whether they are the only reasons, and this article does not say they are wrong.

07The advocates’ figures, attributed

The campaign for an export tax has its own numbers, and each belongs to the people who made it. The Greens, on 3 July 2026, called for ‘a minimum 25 per cent gas export tax’, saying gas companies ‘are expected to receive an additional $18 billion windfall over the next year’ and citing ‘new analysis’ that the release does not attribute. The $18 billion is a claim by a party, not modelling the Greens have named ¹⁸.

The $112 billion is not a committee finding. It appears in the Greens’ additional comments as the Australia Institute’s estimate of gas companies’ windfall profits since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine ⁸. The comments stated: ‘The estimated windfall profits for gas companies since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is $112 billion’ ⁸. It is a cumulative, multi-year estimate, so it cannot be set beside one year of LNG export earnings as if it were the same measure. The $17 billion a year that Senator Pocock and the Greens cite for a 25 per cent export tax is, in Senator Pocock’s comments, ‘as much as $17 billion per year at current forward prices’, from ‘modelling commissioned by Future Group from consultants Arthur D. Little’, ‘consistent with separate analysis by the Australia Institute’. It is modelling commissioned by Future Group, not an independent costing, and it is a different figure from the Greens’ $18 billion ⁸.

In his additional comments Senator Pocock recommended a 25 per cent tax on the value of gas exports that is ‘simple, permanent, based on export revenue rather than profit’ ⁸. He also recommended tighter deduction rules, including a cap on decommissioning cost deductions; an east coast domestic gas reservation mechanism alongside the export tax; and stronger transparency and public reporting, including independent verification of company-reported figures (paragraphs 1.66 to 1.68) ⁸.

Senator Pocock’s release of 2 March 2026 proposed a committee to examine why PRRT on LNG ‘is so low’, comparable policies in Norway and Qatar, and the ACTU’s proposal for a 25% tax on gas export revenue: ‘We get one chance to capture the benefits of the LNG boom and invest in the things Australians need most: housing, health, education.’ Greens Senator Hodgins-May said, as Accounting Times reported on 16 March: ‘Australia doesn’t have a gas shortage. We have an export problem.’ The ABC reported that Senator Pocock raised ‘more than $94,000 in just one week’ for billboards by 21 April, and ‘more than $130,000’ by 2 May, with ‘nearly 10 million’ Instagram views of his clip ¹⁹. The ACTU ‘continues to support a 25 per cent tax on gas’, in the words of 7.30’s reporter on 20 July, not an ACTU quote ¹⁵.

The committee received over 230 public submissions, including five form-letter campaigns that all backed a 25 per cent export levy, and GetUp’s submission carried comments from 50,000 petition signers. Submission numbers measure participation, not the merits of a proposal ⁸.

08The other side, and what is still open

Set against the caption, the record also says the following. The department’s $20 billion, in its June edition, is a forecast of gross export revenue, and it does not net off dearer imported oil and diesel ². In that edition its main forecast rested on an assumption it called ‘not a view on the pathway’ ²; the September edition’s forecasts rest on a central scenario in which oil supply is sufficient to meet demand ‘before Middle East flows pick up and build to pre-conflict levels’ ²⁴. Thermal coal earnings are forecast to fall, in real terms, from 2026-27 to 2027-28 ²⁴. Santos’s half-year profit after tax fell 19 per cent; it says first-half earnings and cash flow ‘reflect one-off commissioning costs and cargo timing’ and that three-month lagging pricing carries JCC oil prices of above US$100 a barrel in the June quarter into the second half ⁴. At home, east coast wholesale gas was cheaper in the June quarter than a year earlier ⁹. Woodside’s reported 27 per cent rise includes a tax item that Woodside says was driven by the higher pricing environment, and its underlying rise was 7 per cent ³.

On tax, Woodside gives its own account of what it pays, which is a self-report ⁶. Treasury officials told the committee that tax paid rose as producers ran down accumulated losses, and that further price pass-through would raise corporate tax paid ⁸. Woodside’s chief financial officer told the committee that a further tax on top of PRRT and company tax would leave him unsure how any project would survive ¹⁷. The Prime Minister and the Resources Minister gave the reasons quoted above ¹⁵¹⁶.

What the record does not settle is also plain. It does not show what Santos’s second half will bring. It does not show the full tax paid by each producer. The committee said the entity-level data needed for a shared understanding of revenue, profits and PRRT is not timely or transparent enough ⁸. And it does not show whether the Treasury modelling of levy options was ever completed or released.

The office of Senator David Pocock was asked four questions in writing on 2 October 2026, at 4.53pm AEST, addressed to his Chief of Staff. They were about the 29 September caption and the reading of ‘bank’ in it; the modelling behind the $17 billion a year figure; a reference to One Nation in his 1 April post on X, which is set out, with the Senate Journal’s record of that day, in article 18 of this series, ‘Seven votes for a gas export tax, all lost’; and whether the office saw any factual error. The office replied by email on 6 October 2026 asking to speak, and spoke to THE RORT on 7 October 2026 on background; nothing from that conversation is reported. No written answer to the questions was received from Senator David Pocock’s office by the deadline, 5pm AEDT on Thursday 8 October 2026.

THE RORT’s emails of 2 October 2026 to Woodside Energy, INPEX, Australian Energy Producers and Tamboran named this article; the emails to the producers added 2pm in Perth to the deadline. The emails asked Woodside and INPEX to check the figures about them that were set out in the emails (for Woodside, its half-year revenue, profit, price, dividend and tax figures; for INPEX, its profit and forecast); asked Woodside, INPEX and Tamboran what tax each has paid in Australia in 2025-26 and how much of the higher prices it expects to reach its tax figures in 2026-27; and asked all four about payments disclosed on their AEC returns and their entries on the Federal Register of Lobbyists, which this article does not report. The email to Australian Energy Producers also asked about an industry campaign described to the Senate committee. The emails did not set out these figures reported here. For Woodside: the Pluto PRRT deferred tax asset of US$417 million after tax (the email gave US$596 million before tax), the income tax expense of US$667 million, profit before tax of US$2,035 million, the PRRT net benefit of US$305 million, the US$782 million of cash income tax and PRRT a year earlier, the 53-cent dividend a year earlier and the 80 per cent payout. For INPEX: the ¥39.6 billion rise in profit attributable to owners, profit before tax of ¥644.3 billion, income tax expense of ¥359.7 billion and revenue of ¥1,000.4 billion. None of them was put to either company before publication. The INPEX question below puts its profit before tax, its income tax expense and its profit attributable to owners; it does not put its revenue.

The email to Woodside gave the income-statement PRRT figure for the half as a net benefit of US$123 million. That was an error by THE RORT: US$123 million is Woodside’s finance income, and the PRRT net benefit in the half-year report is US$305 million, the figure used above ³.

No response was received from Woodside Energy by the deadline, 5pm AEDT on Thursday 8 October 2026. No response was received from INPEX by the deadline, 5pm AEDT on Thursday 8 October 2026. No response was received from Australian Energy Producers by the deadline, 5pm AEDT on Thursday 8 October 2026. No response was received from Tamboran by the deadline, 5pm AEDT on Thursday 8 October 2026.

INPEX’s only message was an automatic reply on 2 October 2026. Two sends to Tamboran on 2 October 2026 were returned as undeliverable; a third send the same day was not returned.

The questions below to the Australian Greens, the Opposition Leader’s office and the Shadow Treasurer’s office were put in THE RORT’s emails of 2 October 2026, which named other articles in this series, not this one: to the Greens, the source and method of the $18 billion figure; to both Opposition offices, what measure would raise the tax take from LNG exporters, and by how much.

The question below to Santos is published here and had not been put to the company when this article was published on 10 October 2026; the date it is put will be added as a dated update. The questions below to the Prime Minister’s office and the Treasurer’s office go through each office’s web form; the date they are put will be added as a dated update.

The producer questions below, to Woodside Energy, INPEX and Australian Energy Producers, are THE RORT’s open questions for this article. They were not among the questions in the 2 October emails, and the no-response lines above refer to those emails, not to these questions. The date each is put will be added. Any answer to any question below, or its absence, will be added with its date.

Woodside Energy Group: your half-year report attributes a 20 per cent rise in the realised price to stronger commodity prices amid global supply disruptions, together with the realisation of premiums, and underlying profit rose from US$1,247 million to US$1,334 million. How much of that rise came from price, and how much from volume or cost?

Santos: your half-year presentation says ‘Global JCC above $100/bbl into Q2 2026’ and that ‘Three-month lagging pricing mechanisms carry this into 2H 2026’. What does that mean for the full-year result?

INPEX: your first-half profit before tax was little changed, down 0.1 per cent to ¥644.3 billion, while profit attributable to owners rose 17.7 per cent as your income tax expense fell ¥42.8 billion. What drove the lower tax expense? And you raised your full-year forecast of profit attributable to owners to ¥510.0 billion, which you attribute mainly to stable Ichthys production and revised assumptions for crude oil prices and exchange rates: how much of that raise comes from price and exchange rates, and how much from production?

Australian Energy Producers: Woodside’s chief financial officer told the committee an export tax on top of PRRT and company tax would leave him unsure how any project would survive, and Treasury officials told it that the increase in tax paid after the Ukraine price spike came from producers running down accumulated losses. Does the industry accept both statements, and what would an export tax change for projects already paying PRRT?

The Prime Minister’s office: the ABC reported on 10 May that the Prime Minister ‘killed off the move’ on new levy options for windfall gas and thermal coal profits, concerned about trading partners. Is that accurate, was the Treasury modelling completed, and will it be released?

The Treasurer’s office: the ABC reported on 20 March that a Prime Minister and Cabinet document asked Treasury to model new levy options. Was any such modelling done, and what became of it?

The Australian Greens: your 3 July release cites new analysis of an additional $18 billion windfall over the next year. What is the source and method?

The Opposition Leader’s and Shadow Treasurer’s offices: your senators on the committee said Australia needs ‘an increased tax take, not an increased tax rate’. What measure would raise that take from LNG exporters, and by how much?

If it’s a rort, we cover it.