The reckoning
The inflation came down. The RBA’s rate rises worked, in the sense that inflation returned to target. This is not contested. What is contested is how the reduction was achieved: who bore the cost, who benefited from the adjustment, and w…
By late 2024, Australian inflation had returned to within the Reserve Bank’s 2 to 3 per cent target band. The thirteen rate rises worked. The official purpose of the rate cycle was achieved.
Update, 29 September 2026. Inflation did not stay there. Annual CPI inflation, 1.9 per cent in June 2025, rose to 3.0 per cent in July 2025 and 3.8 per cent by October, was 3.7 per cent in February 2026 and peaked at 4.6 per cent in March 2026, before easing to 3.5 per cent in July 2026 1617. The Reserve Bank had said in November 2024 that headline inflation would be temporarily within the target range ‘owing primarily to cost-of-living support measures’ 18. After three cuts in 2025 it has raised the cash rate four times in 2026, to 4.60 per cent from 30 September, the highest since 2011 19, and in August expected inflation to return to around the midpoint by late 2027, with underlying inflation at the 2.5 per cent midpoint in 2028 4020. The subtitle’s ‘This is not contested’ and ‘They have not’ describe late 2024, as this article reported it in April 2026; by then inflation was already back above the band (3.7 per cent in February 2026) 17; see also the update under ‘What has not changed’.
Update, 30 September 2026. The fall to 3.5 per cent in July 2026, described above, did not continue in August. The ABS published August CPI on 30 September: annual CPI rose 4.0 per cent in the 12 months to August 2026, up from 3.5 per cent in the 12 months to July, and trimmed mean inflation was 3.6 per cent, unchanged 4647. The words ‘easing to 3.5 per cent in July 2026’ in the update above describe the run to July; 3.5 per cent is no longer the latest figure.
What follows is an accounting of the cost.
Correction, 29 September 2026. The graphic at the head of this article, its description and reference 4 previously said that mortgage stress households rose from about 800,000 to more than 1,500,000, and that the big four banks’ annual profit rose from about A$28 billion to A$32.5 billion (marked as not re-verified). THE RORT has no primary source for the A$32.5 billion or the A$28 billion, could not verify the household figures, and reads the source cited for them as describing mortgage holders, not households; all four figures have been withdrawn. The graphic now shows Roy Morgan’s July 2026 estimate that 32.5 per cent of owner-occupier mortgage holders (1,786,000 people) were ‘At Risk’ of mortgage stress, a survey model that counts people, and KPMG’s figure of A$15.2 billion combined profit after tax for the big four’s latest half-year results, down 2.1 per cent 29; neither has an earlier figure to compare. The caption’s line ‘Bank profits stayed high’ has been replaced to match.
01The lasting damage: real wages
Real wages, wages adjusted for inflation, fell approximately 5 per cent from 2021 by the RBA’s own measurement. They remain around their 2023 trough. For a worker who earned A$80,000 in December 2020, this represents earning approximately A$4,740 less per year in purchasing power terms. The cumulative three-year real wage loss is approximately A$10,000 for this worker.
Nominal wages grew during this period. They grew slower than inflation for most of 2022–23. When they caught up, when wage growth finally began to exceed the now-falling inflation rate, the real wage level had already been reduced. Catching up with a lower inflation rate is not the same as recovering the lost purchasing power.
The Australia Institute calculated that workers who received average annual wage increases over the five years to early 2026 had endured cumulative real wage cuts of approximately 2.57 per cent. For a worker earning A$90,000 in December 2020: earning approximately A$2,780 less per year in real terms.
02The lasting damage: housing
The rate cycle did not just hurt existing mortgage holders. It damaged the structural conditions of Australian housing for years.
Higher interest rates reduced the viability of new residential construction. Fewer homes were built. Australia’s housing shortage, already severe before 2022, deepened during the rate cycle. The shortage that predated inflation was worsened by the response to it.
First home buyers who had saved deposits found their purchasing power reduced by 35 to 40 per cent by the rate rises. Some gave up on home ownership. Those who bought at the bottom of the market, when rates were at their peak, paid the highest possible price in debt servicing costs for their housing.
Real household disposable incomes were not expected to return to December 2019 levels until 2027. For many Australians, the ground lost during the inflation episode will take a decade to recover.
03What has not changed
The structural conditions that contributed to the inflation episode and that determined who bore the adjustment cost are largely unchanged.
The supermarket oligopoly: Woolworths (38%) and Coles (29%) still control 67 per cent of grocery sales. EBIT margins remain among the highest globally. Woolworths and Coles shares surged on the day the ACCC’s report was released. The structural conditions for the next supply-shock margin expansion are intact.
The fossil fuel subsidy: A$16.3 billion in 2025-26 on the Australia Institute’s figures, rising. No windfall tax was introduced during the inflation episode. No windfall tax mechanism exists for the next one.
Correction, 29 September 2026. This paragraph gave fossil fuel subsidies as ‘A$14.9 billion annually, rising’. The direction was right but the figure was out of date when this article was published: the Australia Institute’s March 2026 edition put subsidies at A$16.3 billion in 2025-26, up 9.4 per cent on A$14.9 billion in 2024-25, on its own classification 21. The paragraph, key fact and image have been amended.
The banking oligopoly: four major banks, four pillars policy intact. Bank combined profits were about A$15.5 billion in H1 FY25 (THE RORT's calculation from KPMG's 1H26 figure of A$15.2 billion, down 2.1 per cent). The asymmetric pass-through mechanism is unchanged.
The policy architecture: no standing mechanism for windfall taxes, no mandatory corporate price transparency during supply shocks, no pre-approved household relief packages for the next energy price spike.
Update, 29 September 2026. Since this was written, excessive pricing by ‘very large retailers’ in groceries (currently Coles and Woolworths) has been prohibited from 1 July 2026; no enforcement outcome has been checked 22. Already in force when this was written, though not mentioned here: acquisitions above the thresholds have had to wait for ACCC approval since 1 January 2026 23; APRA has limited lending at a debt-to-income ratio of six or more to 20 per cent of new mortgage lending from February 2026, a limit framed around financial resilience rather than inflation 24; and a Major Bank Levy on liabilities, not profits, has applied since 2017 26. A gas reservation scheme is due to start on 1 July 2027 25. There is still no standing windfall mechanism: the ABC reported that a Prime Minister’s department document asked Treasury in 2026 to model ‘new levy options’ on windfall gas and thermal coal profits, and later reported that the Prime Minister ‘killed off the move, concerned it could upset the trading partners Australia is relying on for fuel’ (the reporter’s characterisation, not a government quote) 27. Every one of the seven recorded parliamentary divisions THE RORT found in 2026 on a gas export tax was lost 28. The government’s stated reasons: the Treasurer said ‘I know that people would like us to go further but there are good reasons to prioritise fuel supply and gas reservation’, and the Prime Minister said on 29 April that ‘The middle of a global fuel crisis is the worst possible time to jeopardise these partnerships, or the investment that underpins them’. The Coalition senators on the gas committee recommended ‘no arbitrary taxation such as a windfall levy on gas exports’, saying Australia ‘needs an increased tax take, not an increased tax rate’ 3738. The majors’ combined half-year profit, which this section put at A$15.5 billion for the first half of FY25, was A$15.2 billion in their latest halves, down 2.1 per cent on 1H25 (KPMG); those halves are mostly from before the 2026 rises, so they neither prove nor disprove that the rises enrich banks 29. APRA puts the profit after tax of all authorised deposit-taking institutions, not only the majors, at A$42.5 billion in the year to June 2026, up 7.5 per cent 30. In the March and June 2026 quarters, the two in which the first three 2026 rises took effect, APRA’s profit figure was A$20.33 billion against A$20.06 billion a year earlier, up 1.4 per cent, and the March 2026 quarter’s bad-debt charge was the highest since at least 2021 30. On the RBA’s tables, the average rate charged on outstanding owner-occupier variable loans and the average rate paid on outstanding household deposits both rose 0.7 points from December 2025 to July 2026, so the gap between them (2.7 points in both months) did not measurably widen at the precision published; this compares one loan type with deposits and is not a bank margin (THE RORT’s arithmetic). The asymmetry in 2026 is at product level: advertised transaction accounts paid nothing from November 2025 to August 2026, advertised cash management accounts and 1-month term deposits rose about 27 to 40 per cent as much as the 0.75 points of rises over that period (THE RORT’s calculation from Table F4: rises of 0.30 and 0.20 points against 0.75), and every advertised bank variable housing rate rose the full 0.75 points, while advertised bonus saver and online saver rates rose 0.80 points, bonus rates only if a deposit is made and nothing withdrawn each month; balances held in each product are not published, so how many savers sit in each is unknown 39.
Correction, 30 September 2026. The paragraph above said a gas reservation scheme is due to start on 1 July 2027. The department’s reform page, last updated 29 September 2026, still says ‘This scheme will commence from 1 July 2027.’ But the ministers’ joint media release of 10 September 2026 says the ‘licence application process will commence from 1 January 2027, with the Domestic Supply Obligation to commence from 1 January 2028’, and the same department page says ‘Obligations are expected to start on 1 January 2028.’ Licence applications therefore start on 1 January 2027 and the Domestic Supply Obligation on 1 January 2028, not on 1 July 2027. The 7 May 2026 announcement gave 1 July 2027 25.
04The next supply shock
Australia will face another supply shock. Supply shocks are not one-off events. Energy price spikes, pandemic-related supply chain disruption, geopolitical trade disruption: these are recurring features of a globalised economy.
In February 2026, the RBA raised rates again. Inflation was re-accelerating, partly because government electricity rebates were removed. Real wages were projected to fall further. The cycle threatened to begin again.
Update, 29 September 2026. The cycle did begin again. The February rise, to 3.85 per cent (announced 3 February, effective 4 February, unanimous) 3119, was followed by rises to 4.10 per cent in March, by five votes to four 32, to 4.35 per cent in May, by eight votes to one 33, and to 4.60 per cent (announced 29 September, effective 30 September), unanimously 3419. The February rise came before the Middle East war: the IEA dates the US and Israeli air strikes on Iran to 28 February, 25 days after the 3 February decision 35. The February statement does not mention oil, fuel, gas, energy or the Middle East; it said global uncertainty ‘remains significant’ and that part of the pick-up in inflation was temporary, and it cited inflation that ‘picked up materially in the second half of 2025’ and private demand ‘growing more quickly than expected’ 31. From March the RBA did name the war: its 17 March statement said ‘the conflict in the Middle East has resulted in sharply higher fuel prices, which, if sustained, will add to inflation’ 32, and its 29 September statement gives the war and higher global energy prices as its first reasons 34. On the rebates: measured electricity prices did jump as they ended (37.0 per cent over the year to February 2026, against 4.9 per cent excluding rebates) 36, but the February statement does not mention energy, so the link drawn here is one of timing only 3631. Real wages did fall further: the real Wage Price Index fell 0.7 per cent over the year to June 2026, and the RBA forecasts real wage growth to turn positive only from mid-2027 20.
The lesson of the 2022–23 episode (that supply-side inflation requires supply-side tools, and that placing the entire burden on monetary policy makes the cost fall hardest on borrowers 45, and among them on lower-income households with thinner buffers 43, while leaving the structural causes of inflation intact) has not been institutionalised. There is no policy architecture in place to respond to the next supply shock differently.
Correction, 29 September 2026. This paragraph said placing the burden on monetary policy ‘transfers wealth from borrowers to banks’. The RBA’s figures do not support that as written: in 2022-23 neither borrowers nor savers got the full rise, and the majors’ lending spread over funding costs fell, though major bank margins increased modestly in 2022 before falling below their pre-pandemic level 42; in 2026 the average rates charged on owner-occupier variable loans and paid on household deposits both rose 0.7 points (see the update under ‘What has not changed’) 39. On the other side, the ABS reported that in the June quarter of 2026 financial corporations’ margins rose ‘as effective interest rates on loans rose more than interest rates on deposits’, a whole sector that includes more than banks, and business as well as housing loans 44. The sentence has been amended.
05What would have helped, and what would help next time
Article 6 of this series documented the tools other OECD countries used that Australia did not. For the next supply shock, the policy toolkit that would more equitably share the adjustment cost:
A standing trigger mechanism for windfall taxes on corporate sectors earning excess profits from supply shocks, defined as profits more than a specified percentage above the preceding four-year average. Revenue directed to household relief.
Mandatory real-time price transparency for oligopolistic food retail, allowing the ACCC to identify margin expansion as it occurs, not 14 months after the peak.
Correction, 29 September 2026. ‘Eighteen months after the peak’ repeated an interval that was wrong on the dates in ‘The political connections’: from the December 2022 inflation peak to the February 2024 direction of the ACCC inquiry is about 14 months (THE RORT’s count; the dates are as given in that article and were not re-checked in this round) 41. The phrase has been amended.
Pre-approved household energy relief packages, automatically triggered when energy prices exceed a threshold: the French tariff shield model.
A structural review of bank deposit rate pass-through, ensuring that banks move mortgage and deposit rates at symmetrical speed when the cash rate moves in either direction.
Correction, 29 September 2026. This recommendation was garbled: when the cash rate is cut, a symmetrical pass-through would lower deposit rates, not raise them. It should have read: a structural review ensuring banks move mortgage and deposit rates at symmetrical speed when the cash rate moves in either direction. The recommendation has been amended.
Each of these tools is available. Each has been demonstrated in comparable economies. Each reduces the harm to households without preventing inflation from being addressed. None requires political invention. All require political will.
If it’s a rort, we cover it.
- Review: one year after the 29 September 2026 updateA year after the 29 September 2026 update, this article is re-read against the record.
Read the desk note
REVIEW 29 September 2027 (case: THE INFLATION RORT). Re-read this article against the record a year after the 29 September 2026 update: every dated note, every figure marked as a forecast or projection, and every claim still marked unverified in this article’s dated notes. NEXT DATE: none set.
- Record: article 8 updated, 30 September 2026One dated correction (the gas reservation scheme’s start dates) and one dated update: the ABS August CPI (annual 4.0 per cent, up from 3.5 per cent in July) after the article's 'easing to 3.5 per cent in July'.
Read the desk note
UPDATED 30 September 2026 (case: THE INFLATION RORT, article 8, The reckoning).
ARTICLE CHANGES. One correction and one update. Correction, in the section on what has not changed: the sentence that a gas reservation scheme is due to start on 1 July 2027. The ministers’ joint media release of 10 September 2026 says licence applications start on 1 January 2027 and the Domestic Supply Obligation on 1 January 2028. The sentence is left as published, with a dated correction after it. Update, in the opening, after the 29 September update that said inflation was 'easing to 3.5 per cent in July 2026': the ABS published August CPI on 30 September, annual CPI 4.0 per cent, up from 3.5 per cent in July. Two references added, and the release added to reference 25. No published sentence was rewritten.
STILL OPEN. Nothing new opened by this update.
NEXT DATE: 29 September 2027, review.
- Record: article 8 updated, 29 September 2026Seven dated notes: four corrections, three updates.
Read the desk note
UPDATED 29 September 2026 (case: THE INFLATION RORT, article 8 of THE INFLATION RORT).
ARTICLE CHANGES. Corrections: the fossil fuel subsidy figure (A$16.3 billion in 2025-26, up 9.4 per cent, on the Australia Institute's classification, not A$14.9 billion; text, key fact and image); 'eighteen months after the peak' (about 14 months); the deposit rate recommendation, which had said deposit rates rise when the cash rate is cut; the lesson sentence, which said the burden transfers wealth from borrowers to banks. Withdrawn: the graphic's mortgage stress households (about 800,000 to more than 1,500,000) and big four annual profit (about A$28 billion to A$32.5 billion) figures, with the reference [4] description and the caption's 'Bank profits stayed high', replaced by Roy Morgan's July 2026 estimate (people, not households) and KPMG's half-year profit; see the Correction. Qualified inline without a dated note: the caption’s ‘Bank profits were record’ and the image’s ‘(record)’ label (not re-verified; now ‘stayed high’ and ‘not re-verified’). Updates: inflation since April 2026 and the four 2026 rises to 4.60 per cent; the cycle beginning again, with the February rise dated against the war and the electricity rebates; the reforms in force or due (some already in force when this was written and not mentioned), the windfall record and the banks’ profit figures with the deposit and loan rates beside them; the RBA’s naming of the war from March; the 2028 and late 2027 inflation dates.
STILL OPEN. The April 2026 figures in the text, key facts and image (real wages, household income, borrowing capacity, supermarket shares and margins) were not re-verified.
NEXT DATE: 3 November 2026, the next Board decision.
- RBA: real wages declined ~5% since 2021, at 2023 trough. https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2024/oct/developments-in-wages-growth-across-pay-setting-methods.html. Real wages (WPI measure) declined approximately 5% since 2021 and remain around their 2023 trough. Cumulative three-year real wage loss: approximately A$10,000+ for an A$80,000 worker.
- AFR / Chris Richardson: real household disposable income 2027 recovery. https://www.afr.com/. Real household disposable incomes fell 6.1%. Not expected to return to December 2019 levels until 2027. Largest fall in living standards since records began in 1959.
- NHFIC: housing supply crisis deepened by rate cycle. https://nhfic.gov.au/. Housing construction activity fell during the rate cycle. Australia’s housing shortage was worsened by the policy response to inflation.
- Roy Morgan via UNSW BusinessThink (October 2023 figure, withdrawn). https://www.businessthink.unsw.edu.au/articles/big-bank-profits-interest-rates-mortgage-stress-RBA. This reference was cited for ‘1.5 million+ households at mortgage stress by October 2023, up 700,000+ from the pre-hike period’; as THE RORT reads it, the page describes mortgage holders, not households, and THE RORT could not verify the figure, so the article no longer uses it. See the Correction of 29 September 2026. The graphic now uses Roy Morgan’s own July 2026 estimate: https://www.roymorgan.com/findings/10318-mortgage-stress-risk-july-2026. 32.5% of owner-occupier mortgage holders (1,786,000 people) ‘At Risk’; a survey model that counts people, not households.
- ACCC: supermarkets still not restructured (ongoing). https://theconversation.com/accc-finds-australias-supermarkets-are-among-the-worlds-most-profitable-but-doesnt-accuse-them-of-price-gouging-250503. Grocery prices up 24% over 5 years. No structural competition remedy. Future supply shocks will encounter the same concentrated market.
- RBA: first rate cut February 2025. https://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/cash-rate/. First cut from 4.35% to 4.10%. The path back to neutral is gradual.
- ABS: WPI vs CPI real wage trajectory. https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/price-indexes-and-inflation/consumer-price-index-australia. Nominal wages rose but slower than CPI. The accumulated real wage loss is not recovered by catching up with a lower inflation rate.
- Australia Institute: accumulated real wage loss. https://australiainstitute.org.au/post/real-wage-falls-and-rate-rises-make-for-a-double-whammy/. Workers who received average annual wage increases endured cumulative real wage cuts of approximately 2.57%. For an A$90,000 worker: approximately A$2,780 less per year in real terms.
- Housing affordability crisis: rate cycle compounding existing shortage. https://nhfic.gov.au/. Rate rises reduced borrowing capacity by 35–40%, reduced construction viability, pushed landlords to raise rents, and locked out first home buyers.
- RBA: second rate rise cycle February 2026. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2026/02/04/jgjm-f04.html. February 2026: RBA raised cash rate again to 3.85%. Inflation re-accelerating partly due to removal of electricity rebates. Real wages projected to fall further.
- ACCC: Coles and Woolworths share surge on report day. https://money.usnews.com/investing/news/articles/2025-03-20/australias-supermarkets-grew-profit-margins-as-living-costs-soared-says-regulator. Shares surged on the absence of structural reform recommendations. The market’s judgment: structural conditions allowing margin expansion remain intact.
- Australia Institute: lesson not learned about tool selection. https://australiainstitute.org.au/. The policy lesson has not been institutionalised. No standing mechanism for rapid deployment of windfall taxes. Australia is not better prepared for the next supply shock.
- Welfare / social impact: lasting damage to low-income households. https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/confs/2023/pdf/rba-conference-2023-wood-chan-coates.pdf. Lower-income households had higher effective inflation rates, less buffer savings, and higher debt-to-income ratios. The lasting damage falls hardest on those who were most financially precarious.
- What would have helped: policy recommendations. https://grattan.edu.au/. Earlier ACCC inquiry, windfall tax on energy sector, targeted household energy relief, bank competition policy, pre-existing mandatory price transparency. All demonstrated by other OECD countries.
- RBA: inflation back within target band by late 2024. https://www.rba.gov.au/. Inflation returned within the 2–3% target band by late 2024. The rate rises achieved their stated objective. The argument of this series is about who bore the cost and whether better tools could have shared the burden more equitably.
- ABS: Consumer Price Index media release for July 2026 (26 August 2026). https://www.abs.gov.au/media-centre/media-releases/cpi-rose-35-year-july-2026. ‘The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rose 3.5 per cent in the 12 months to July 2026, down from 3.8 per cent in the 12 months to June.’ The release table gives annual CPI of 1.9 per cent (June 2025), 3.0 (July 2025), 3.8 (October 2025), 3.8 (December 2025), 4.6 (March 2026) and 3.5 (July 2026).
- RBA: Statement on Monetary Policy, February 2026, overview. https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/smp/2026/feb/overview.html. ‘Underlying inflation rose to 3.4 per cent over the year to the December quarter.’ ABS: Consumer Price Index media release for March 2026 (29 April 2026). https://www.abs.gov.au/media-centre/media-releases/cpi-rose-46-year-march-2026. ‘March CPI inflation of 4.6 per cent is up from the 3.7 per cent annual inflation to February.’
- RBA: Statement on Monetary Policy, November 2024, outlook. https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/smp/2024/nov/outlook.html. ‘headline inflation is expected to temporarily be within the target range over the coming year, owing primarily to cost-of-living support measures.’
- RBA: cash rate target table (fetched 29 September 2026). https://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/cash-rate/. Entries: ‘13 Aug 2025 -0.25 3.60’, ‘4 Feb 2026 +0.25 3.85’, ‘6 May 2026 +0.25 4.35’, ‘30 Sep 2026 +0.25 4.60’; earlier, ‘5 Oct 2011 0.00 4.75’ and ‘2 Nov 2011 -0.25 4.50’. Any change in the target takes effect the following day. The four 2026 rises total 100 basis points from 3.60 per cent (THE RORT’s arithmetic on the table).
- RBA: Statement on Monetary Policy, August 2026, outlook. https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/smp/2026/aug/outlook.html. ‘Underlying inflation is expected to remain above 3 per cent until mid-2027 before declining to the midpoint of the 2–3 per cent target range in 2028.’ Table 3.1: the real Wage Price Index fell 0.7 per cent and real average earnings per hour (non-farm) 1.2 per cent over the year to June 2026; the table forecasts real wage growth positive only from mid-2027.
- Australia Institute: fossil fuel subsidies series, each year’s edition. Edition of 12 March 2026: https://australiainstitute.org.au/post/australian-fossil-fuel-subsidies-growing-faster-than-ndis-hitting-16-3-billion-in-2025-26/. ‘$16.3 billion in subsidies to fossil fuel producers and major users in 2025-26’, ‘up 9.4% on the $14.9 billion recorded in 2024–25’. Edition of 21 March 2025: https://australiainstitute.org.au/report/fossil-fuel-subsidies-in-australia-2025/. ‘In 2024–25, Australian governments provided $14.9 billion worth of spending and tax breaks to assist fossil fuel producers.’ The totals are the Australia Institute’s own classification; whether the fuel tax credit counts as a subsidy is contested and no government or industry rebuttal was checked.
- Treasury: Assistant Treasurer Andrew Leigh, media release on price gouging by large supermarkets becoming illegal from 1 July 2026 (27 June 2026). https://ministers.treasury.gov.au/ministers/andrew-leigh-2025/media-releases/price-gouging-large-supermarkets-illegal-1-july-2026. ‘From 1 July 2026, it will be illegal for very large retailers such as Coles and Woolworths to charge prices that are excessive, when compared to the cost of supply plus a reasonable margin.’ ACCC: https://www.accc.gov.au/business/industry-codes/food-and-grocery-code-of-conduct/supermarkets-excessive-pricing-prohibition. ACCC test: ‘significantly excessive’; ‘very large retailers’ are those with more than $30 billion in revenue; maximum penalty the greater of $10 million, three times the benefit or 10 per cent of turnover. No enforcement outcome was checked.
- ACCC: ‘New merger control regime off to positive start’ (9 April 2026). https://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/new-merger-control-regime-off-to-positive-start. Since 1 January 2026 merger notification above thresholds is mandatory and suspensory: parties ‘must wait for ACCC approval before they can proceed with a notifiable acquisition’.
- APRA: ‘APRA announces update on macroprudential settings’ (23 July 2025). https://www.apra.gov.au/news-and-publications/apra-announces-update-on-macroprudential-settings. Chair John Lonsdale ‘noted that the current level of the buffer has not been restrictive on new credit to the household sector.’ APRA: ‘Activating debt-to-income limits as a macroprudential policy tool’ (27 November 2025). https://www.apra.gov.au/activating-debt-to-income-limits-as-a-macroprudential-policy-tool. ‘from February 2026, they limit residential mortgage lending with a DTI ratio greater than or equal to six to 20 per cent of all new mortgage lending.’
- DCCEEW: gas market review reforms (updated 10 September 2026). https://www.dcceew.gov.au/energy/markets/gas-markets/gas-market-review-reforms. ‘This scheme will commence from 1 July 2027.’ Joint media release, 7 May 2026: https://minister.dcceew.gov.au/bowen/media-releases/joint-media-release-albanese-government-secure-australian-gas-australian-users. Legislation was at exposure-draft stage on 10 September 2026. Added 30 September 2026: joint media release, Securing more affordable gas for Australians, 10 September 2026, https://www.minister.industry.gov.au/king/media/securing-more-affordable-gas-australians ‘licence application process will commence from 1 January 2027, with the Domestic Supply Obligation to commence from 1 January 2028’. The department page, last updated 29 September 2026, also says ‘Obligations are expected to start on 1 January 2028.’
- Treasury: Explanatory Memorandum, Major Bank Levy (2017). https://ministers.treasury.gov.au/sites/ministers.treasury.gov.au/files/2019-05/Final-EM-Major-Bank-Levy.pdf. Parliamentary Budget Office, costing of a 10 per cent increase to the Major Bank Levy (14 May 2024). https://www.pbo.gov.au/sites/default/files/2024-05/Increase%20to%20the%20rate%20of%20the%20Major%20Bank%20Levy%20by%2010%20percent.pdf. ‘The proposal would increase the Major Bank Levy from the current level (0.06% per annum, 0.015 per quarter)’; ‘There are currently 5 banks captured by the levy’. A levy on certain liabilities of banks with over $100 billion in liabilities, from 1 July 2017; not a levy on profits.
- ABC News, Isobel Roe (20 March 2026). https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-03-20/government-explores-new-tax-for-gas-coal-to-buffer-fuel-costs/106475100. A Prime Minister and Cabinet document asking Treasury to model ‘new levy options’ on windfall gas and thermal coal profits: ‘Energy producers should not benefit from high international prices at the expense of domestic customers.’ ABC News, Jane Norman (10 May 2026). https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-05-10/gas-tax-revenue-up-in-federal-budget/106663036. Reported that the Prime Minister ‘killed off the move, concerned it could upset the trading partners Australia is relying on for fuel’ (the reporter’s characterisation, not a government quote).
- Parliament of Australia, records read by THE RORT on 29 September 2026. Recorded divisions on a gas export tax in 2026: Senate 12 March (13-35 on the Greens’ amendment for a minimum 25% gas export tax; 13-34 on a Pocock sub-amendment), 31 March (10-26), 1 April (12-32), 29 June (10-33) and 12 August (11-30); House of Representatives 2 June (9-71). Sources: Journals of the Senate No. 39 (12 March 2026), No. 45 (31 March, item 30), No. 46 (1 April, item 12), No. 54 (29 June, item 27) and No. 59 (12 August, item 26); House of Representatives Votes and Proceedings No. 61 (2 June 2026, item 6). Every one was lost. THE RORT’s tally; no 2026 Senate division on a bank windfall tax was found. No. 39: https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fjournals%2Fdca27c74-848a-42ca-8c5c-9ae85b395dca%2F0007%22; No. 45 item 30: https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fjournals%2Faa42bc2f-9465-48fd-bae7-d8aa30d4e77c%2F0031%22; No. 46 item 12: https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fjournals%2F521e5623-a639-4d7e-b49b-bbbe193dfb7b%2F0013%22; No. 54 item 27: https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fjournals%2F3cd2c83a-caa1-41ed-b6fd-42f296785964%2F0028%22; No. 59 item 26: https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fjournals%2Fe54de60d-a625-492c-b0b2-de1bd9cfeb93%2F0027%22; HVP No. 61 item 6: https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fvotes%2Fb8006be3-3f21-413b-9e71-74f95c642860%2F0007%22
- KPMG Australia: analysis of the major banks’ half-year results (5 May 2026). https://kpmg.com/au/en/insights/industry/big-four-major-banks-australia-half-year-results-2026.html. ‘combined profit after tax of $15.2 billion, down 2.1% compared to 1H25.’ CBA’s half is to December 2025 and the others’ to March 2026, so mostly before the 2026 rises. Margin stable at 178 basis points; net interest income up 4.9% to $40.5 billion.
- APRA: Quarterly Authorised Deposit-taking Institution Performance Statistics workbook, September 2004 to June 2026 (September 2026 edition). https://www.apra.gov.au/quarterly-authorised-deposit-taking-institution-performance-statistics-highlights-1. ‘Net profit after tax (year-end) ($bn) 39.6 42.5 7.5%’: A$42.5 billion in the year to June 2026, up 7.5 per cent, for all authorised deposit-taking institutions. In the March and June 2026 quarters combined, profit was A$20.33 billion against A$20.06 billion a year earlier, up 1.4 per cent (THE RORT’s sum of the quarters); the charge for bad or doubtful debts in the March 2026 quarter was A$1,678.3 million, the highest since at least 2021.
- RBA: Media Release 2026-03, Monetary Policy Decision (3 February 2026). https://www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/2026/mr-26-03.html. ‘At its meeting today, the Board decided to increase the cash rate target by 25 basis points to 3.85 per cent.’ ‘Today’s policy decision was unanimous.’ ‘While inflation has fallen substantially since its peak in 2022, it picked up materially in the second half of 2025.’ ‘it is evident that private demand is growing more quickly than expected, capacity pressures are greater than previously assessed and labour market conditions are a little tight’. The statement does not mention the Middle East, oil, fuel, gas or energy; it says global uncertainty ‘remains significant’ and that ‘part of the pick-up in inflation is assessed to reflect temporary factors’.
- RBA: Media Release 2026-08, Monetary Policy Decision (17 March 2026). https://www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/2026/mr-26-08.html. ‘five members voted to increase the cash rate target by 25 basis points to 4.10 per cent; four members voted to leave the cash rate target unchanged at 3.85 per cent.’ The statement also said: ‘the conflict in the Middle East has resulted in sharply higher fuel prices, which, if sustained, will add to inflation.’
- RBA: Media Release 2026-12, Monetary Policy Decision (5 May 2026). https://www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/2026/mr-26-12.html. ‘eight members voted to increase the cash rate target by 25 basis points to 4.35 per cent; one member voted to leave the cash rate target unchanged at 4.10 per cent.’
- RBA: Media Release 2026-27, Monetary Policy Decision (29 September 2026, 14:30 AEST). https://www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/2026/mr-26-27.html. ‘At its meeting today, the Board decided to increase the cash rate target by 25 basis points to 4.60 per cent.’ ‘Today’s policy decision was unanimous.’ ‘The conflict in the Middle East has broadened and global energy prices are now much higher than had been assumed in the August forecasts.’ ‘Higher fuel prices have partially been passed through to prices of other goods and services. This inflation impulse is in addition to the effect of capacity pressures in the economy.’
- International Energy Agency, Oil Market Report, March 2026 (12 March 2026). https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-march-2026. ‘Oil prices have gyrated wildly since the United States and Israel launched joint air strikes on Iran on 28 February.’ U.S. EIA, Today in Energy (7 April 2026): https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=67424, ‘military action in the Middle East on February 28 and the subsequent de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz’. The 25 days is THE RORT’s count from 3 February to 28 February.
- ABS: Consumer Price Index media release for February 2026 (25 March 2026). https://www.abs.gov.au/media-centre/media-releases/cpi-rose-37-year-february-2026. ‘Excluding the impact of both the Commonwealth and State Government electricity rebates over the previous year, electricity prices rose 4.9 per cent in the 12 months to February.’ Measured electricity prices rose 37.0 per cent over the same 12 months. The timing point is THE RORT’s analysis, not a finding of the RBA or ABS.
- ABC News, Jane Norman (10 May 2026). https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-05-10/gas-tax-revenue-up-in-federal-budget/106663036. The Treasurer, Jim Chalmers, reported as saying: ‘I know that people would like us to go further but there are good reasons to prioritise fuel supply and gas reservation.’ ABC News, federal politics live blog (29 April 2026). https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-04-29/federal-politics-blog-housing-energy-fastrack/106616572. Prime Minister Albanese: ‘The middle of a global fuel crisis is the worst possible time to jeopardise these partnerships, or the investment that underpins them.’
- Senate Select Committee on the Taxation of Gas Resources, report (additional comments dated 7 May 2026), Coalition senators’ additional comments (Senators Susan McDonald and Dean Smith), paragraphs 1.54 to 1.55. https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Taxation_of_Gas_Resources/TaxationofGasResources/Report/Coalition_Senators_Additional_Comments. ‘The Coalition members of the committee recommend that there be no arbitrary taxation such as a windfall levy on gas exports’; their view is that Australia ‘needs an increased tax take, not an increased tax rate’.
- RBA statistical tables, each published 7 September 2026. Table F4.1 (paid deposit rates): https://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/tables/csv/f4.1-data.csv: average rate paid on all outstanding household deposits 2.8 per cent (31 December 2025) and 3.5 (31 July 2026). Table F6 (housing lending rates): https://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/tables/csv/f6-data.csv: outstanding owner-occupier variable-rate loans, all institutions, 5.5 and 6.2; the gap to the household deposit rate is 2.7 points in both months (THE RORT’s arithmetic; the tables are to one decimal place, so a change of about 0.1 to 0.2 points could be hidden by rounding; one loan type against deposits is not a bank margin). Table F5 (indicator lending rates): https://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/tables/csv/f5-data.csv: standard owner-occupier variable rate 8.02 (31 December 2025) to 8.77 (31 August 2026); discounted (professional package) 6.05 to 6.80. Table F4 (retail deposit and investment rates): https://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/tables/csv/f4-data.csv: transaction account ($5,000) 0.00 in every month from November 2025 to August 2026; cash management account ($10,000) 0.25 to 0.55 and ($50,000) 0.40 to 0.70; 1-month term deposit 1.20 to 1.40. Balances held in each product are not published. Advertised bonus saver 4.00 to 4.80 (only if a deposit is made and nothing withdrawn each month) and online saver 2.30 to 3.10, both up 0.80. The 40 per cent (cash management, 0.30 of 0.75 points) and 27 per cent (1-month term deposit, 0.20 of 0.75) are THE RORT’s calculation.
- RBA: Media Release 2026-19, Monetary Policy Decision (11 August 2026). https://www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/2026/mr-26-19.html. ‘It is not expected to return to around the midpoint of the target range until late 2027 and there are upside risks to this projection.’ The August Statement on Monetary Policy (reference [20]) puts the midpoint in 2028, so both dates are given.
- THE RORT, ‘The political connections’ (this series), correction of 29 September 2026. https://therort.com.au/article/inflation-rort/the-political-connections. From the December 2022 inflation peak to the February 2024 direction of the ACCC Supermarkets Inquiry is about 14 months; the count is THE RORT’s.
- RBA: Statement on Monetary Policy, November 2023, domestic financial conditions. https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/smp/2023/nov/domestic-financial-conditions.html. ‘the average interest rate on total deposits excluding offset accounts increased by 325 basis points over the hiking phase, around 75 per cent of the total increase in the cash rate.’ ‘The average outstanding variable rate increased by around 70 basis points less than the cash rate between May 2022 and September 2023’; ‘the spread between lending rates and funding costs declined 60 basis points to around 190 basis points’ (major banks). ‘Although major bank NIMs increased modestly in 2022, they have more recently declined below their pre-pandemic level.’
- RBA Bulletin, ‘An Update on the Household Cash Flow Channel of Monetary Policy’ (Jennison and Miller, 30 January 2025). https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2025/jan/an-update-on-the-household-cash-flow-channel-of-monetary-policy.html. ‘Looking just at households with housing debt, the impact of interest rate increases on disposable income is greater for lower income households.’ The estimate is for the September quarter 2024, before the 2026 rises. RBA Financial Stability Review, March 2026, https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/fsr/2026/mar/resilience-of-australian-households-and-businesses.html: most borrowers have large liquidity and equity buffers, larger than before the pandemic in every income quartile; lower-income households have the thinnest.
- ABS: Australian National Accounts, June quarter 2026 (2 September 2026). https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/national-accounts/australian-national-accounts-national-income-expenditure-and-product/latest-release. ‘Financial corporations GOS rose 2.4%, driven by growth in balances and margins, particularly for dwelling and business loans. Margins rose as effective interest rates on loans rose more than interest rates on deposits.’ Financial corporations is a whole ABS sector, not banks alone.
- RBA: Christopher Kent, Assistant Governor, speech of 11 October 2023. https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2023/sp-ag-2023-10-11.html. ‘When interest rates go up, households pay more on their debt and earn more on their savings. Because the cash-flow channel is so noticeable, and felt so keenly by borrowers, it gets a lot of attention’.
- Australian Bureau of Statistics: media release, ‘CPI rose 4.0% in the year to August 2026’ (Consumer Price Index, Australia, August 2026), released 30 September 2026, 11:30am AEST. https://www.abs.gov.au/media-centre/media-releases/cpi-rose-40-year-august-2026. Fetched 11:54 AEST, 30 September 2026. ‘The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rose 4.0 per cent in the 12 months to August 2026, up from 3.5 per cent in the 12 months to July’; ‘Trimmed mean annual inflation remained steady at 3.6 per cent for the third consecutive month in August’.
- Australian Bureau of Statistics: Consumer Price Index, Australia, August 2026, release page, released 30 September 2026, 11:30am AEST. https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/price-indexes-and-inflation/consumer-price-index-australia/aug-2026. Fetched 11:54 AEST, 30 September 2026. ‘The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rose 4.0%, up from 3.5% in the 12 months to July 2026. Trimmed mean inflation was 3.6%, unchanged from the 12 months to July 2026. In the month of August, the CPI rose 0.4% in original and 0.7% in seasonally adjusted terms.’.