The grill

On 29 September 2026 the Reserve Bank’s Monetary Policy Board raised the cash rate by 25 basis points to 4.60 per cent, the fourth rise of 2026. The decision was unanimous ¹. The Board’s stated reasons put the widening Middle East war and global energy prices first ¹. Who else could have acted, and on what, is what this article asks of those who decide.

This article does not answer that with a verdict. It publishes questions, and holds each of them to the standard THE RORT applies to everything else: each rests on a public document or statement, most from the office asked, each can be answered directly, most with a yes, a no or a number, and where the record has a date for it, the question carries that date.

Nothing here says that any question has been sent or put to anyone. We publish the questions today. Answers will be added as they arrive, each as a dated update under its question. Where no answer has been published by the date the record can settle a question, the update will say so.

01How to read this

Each question has four parts. First, the record it rests on: a statement, a table, a vote or a document from the office being asked, with a reference number. Second, that office’s own position where the record has one, so the charge and the answer sit side by side. Third, the question, put so that it can be answered directly, most with a yes, a no or a number. Fourth, a line marked Checkable: the date or event by which the public record can settle it, or ‘answer’ where only the office can.

The codes are for later reference. G is the Governor and the Monetary Policy Board (17 questions), T the Treasurer (14), P the Prime Minister (4) and O the Opposition, its leader, Shadow Treasurer, senators and members (5).

A question is not a finding, and nothing here says why anyone did anything. No question asks about any person’s own holdings or finances. The two questions about how the Board’s interests are disclosed (G15 and T11) ask about the system, not about any member.

The desk will next review answers on Wednesday 7 October 2026 and record every answer it has received by then. Answers that arrive later will be added as they come.

We know that when interest rates go up, that adds to the pressure that people feel, that people feel already, and that’s why we accept our part, our responsibility for our part in this fight against inflation.

Two sets of words frame much of what follows. The Governor has called the cash rate ‘our only instrument we’ve got’ and ‘all we have’ ²³. The Treasurer says the government accepts its part ³⁴, and says a big driver of inflation ‘comes from the Middle East’ ³⁴³⁶. Treasury’s own Final Budget Outcome, published on 28 September, calls the pass-through of broader Middle East cost pressures to consumer prices ‘subdued’ ⁴². T3 asks about that.

02To the Governor and the Board

G1. The only instrument. The Governor called the cash rate ‘our only instrument we’ve got’ (3 February) and ‘all we have’ (5 May), and said fiscal policy ‘has many more things that it can do’ ²³. The government’s own 2026-27 Budget says fiscal policy is better suited than monetary policy to respond to supply shocks such as the oil shock ⁴, and the Bank’s 29 September reasons put the war and global energy prices first ¹. The Treasury Secretary sits on the Board and votes ⁷; the Review kept the seat, calling a voting Treasury Secretary unusual among peers but saying no Secretary had been directed in recent decades to argue the Treasurer’s position, and the Bank says the Secretary’s independence on the Board ‘was made explicit by legislation’ ³⁰. The March and May Minutes do not use the word ‘fiscal’ or discuss Australian fiscal policy as a response to inflation ⁵⁶. The other side: the Governor says ‘I’m not going to tell the government what to do with fiscal policy. That’s not my business’, and that fiscal policy is ‘not a very nimble way to address inflation’, though governments spending heavily against capacity limits ‘do need to think about’ ways to constrain demand ²³. The IMF’s July update says fiscal policy ‘should avoid broad-based subsidies, tax cuts, and price controls’ ¹⁴. Question: did the Board discuss on 29 September what fiscal measures would reduce the rises it judged necessary, and has the Bank put a view to the government in 2026? Checkable: the Minutes, 13 October, 11.30 am ⁴⁹; Supplementary Budget Estimates, 28 and 29 October (the Bank’s attendance is not yet posted) ⁴⁹.

G2. The war’s share. The Bank puts higher fuel prices at 0.8 percentage points of March’s headline inflation of 4.6 per cent ¹⁰. It puts the war’s indirect cost effect, excluding the direct effect of retail fuel prices, at ‘a bit more than 0.1 percentage points’ of June-quarter trimmed mean inflation, and says elevated underlying inflation (3.6 per cent) reflects capacity pressures ‘along with’ the conflict’s higher input costs ⁹. Those figures are the Bank’s own and are published. THE RORT has not found in the sources it read a Bank figure for the direct fuel contribution to June-quarter headline inflation, or a split of the 2026 rises between war pass-through and domestic capacity ⁹¹¹. Question: will the next Statement on Monetary Policy publish both? Checkable: the next Statement (its date is not in THE RORT’s sources); the 3 November media conference ⁴⁹.

G3. What the rises cannot do. On 5 May the Governor said the rises ‘will have no impact’ on the oil-driven inflation, and that they ‘are not going to do anything for inflation in the next six months. That’s done and dusted’ ³. The other side, in the same remarks: their job is to contain domestic pressure after the oil effect eases, and the oil shock is not the sole reason, because ‘we had an inflation problem before this’ ³. On 29 September the Board’s stated mechanism is to keep aggregate demand subdued ‘for a period’ ¹. Question: which part of the inflation above target does the Board expect the 29 September rise to reduce, by how much, and by when? Checkable: answer; the next Statement on Monetary Policy; the 3 November media conference ⁴⁹.

G4. The estimate not published. The Bank’s cross-model estimate is that a 100 basis point rise has its peak effect after one to two years, lowering the level of GDP by ¼ to 1 per cent and year-ended inflation by ⅛ to ½ of a percentage point ¹². Its main model, MARTIN, has (in a 2019 paper) a 100 basis point rise lasting four quarters raising unemployment by 0.3 points ¹³. THE RORT found no Bank estimate of what the 2026 rises do to unemployment or inflation in the May and August Statements ¹¹. The other side: the Bank stresses that ‘the entire future path of interest rates matters’ ¹², and the August Statement says the process ‘will take some time, reflecting the normal lags’ ¹¹. Question: will the Bank publish an estimate of what the 2026 rises do to unemployment and inflation? Checkable: yes or no; the next Statement on Monetary Policy; the 3 November media conference ⁴⁹.

G5. The IMF’s condition. The IMF says central banks may look through negative supply shocks only while expectations are anchored and the stance is ‘already properly calibrated’ ¹⁴. The war began at the end of February, 25 days after the Bank’s first 2026 rise decision on 3 February ¹⁵. In March the Board’s majority judged conditions ‘not sufficiently restrictive’ and warned that rising expectations would ‘ultimately require significantly more contractionary monetary policy’, while conceding that the war’s effect on demand was uncertain because Australia is a net energy exporter with healthy household balance sheets ⁵. Question: was the stance properly calibrated when the war began? Checkable: answer; the Minutes, 13 October ⁴⁹.

G6. Wages and prices. On 22 September Board member Iain Ross said, in his own name and not the Board’s, that there is ‘no evidence of the emergence of a wage-price spiral’ now, because the 1970s mechanisms are gone and enterprise agreements lock wages until expiry ¹⁸. The Bank’s stated mechanism on 29 September is to keep demand subdued ‘for a period’ ¹. The other side: the May Minutes say policy could not ‘alter the near-term trajectory of inflation’, but could limit the risk of a broader, sustained lift by bringing demand into line with supply and anchoring expectations ⁶. Question: did the Board judge on 29 September that wage and price dynamics justified the rise, and on what evidence? Did Mr Ross attend? Checkable: the Minutes, 13 October; attendance is listed, as it was for March and May, when all nine members attended ⁵⁶⁴⁹.

G7. Who bears it. The 29 September statement records falling house prices and a noticeable drop in new housing loans and, in the next breath, strong growth in business investment and business debt ¹. That is a juxtaposition of the Bank’s own sentences, not a Bank finding on who bears the burden. The March Financial Stability Review says a higher cash rate reaches small businesses faster than large corporates, because many small firms borrow at variable rates secured on a home, while larger firms issue fixed-rate debt or hedge ¹⁹. Question: does the Bank estimate how the 2026 tightening is shared between households and businesses, and between small and large firms, and will it publish that? Checkable: yes or no; the next Financial Stability Review (its date is not in THE RORT’s sources).

G8. Profits. None of the six 2026 decision statements, the 11 August media conference transcript or the August Statement’s Outlook chapter contains ‘profit’ or ‘markup’ ¹⁸²². That is a scoped absence: the other Minutes, other chapters, speeches and research were not searched for it; the March and May Minutes were, and they do not discuss corporate profits or margins arising from the war ⁵⁶. The other side: Bank staff research (a staff article, not a Board view) finds that from 2023 to early 2026 import prices and business owner returns ‘moderated significantly’ as drivers of consumer price growth, in a window that ends before the war ²⁰; and a May Bulletin by Bank staff judges that margins had ‘only a modest impact’ and warns against ‘margins drove inflation’ narratives, while finding that the unwinding of margin squeezes ‘accentuat[ed] the pick-up’ in late 2025 ²¹. Question: does the Board weigh firms’ margins and exporters’ war revenues when it sets the rate? Checkable: the 3 November and 8 December statements and media conferences ⁴⁹.

G9. Unemployment. On 22 September the Governor said ‘I think between 4.5 and 5 will probably take enough heat out of the labor market that it’ll ease pressure on inflation’. In the same answer she said 4.5 per cent ‘at the moment’ is ‘a bit tight’, that ‘having a job is really important’ and that ‘high unemployment is not great’ ¹⁷. Unemployment was 4.6 per cent in August. Over the year the number of unemployed people rose by 80,000 to 722,900, while employment rose by 238,100 to 14,836,600. Youth (15 to 24) unemployment was 10.8 per cent, more than double the national rate ¹⁶. The Bank forecasts unemployment rising from 4.4 per cent in June 2026 to 4.8 per cent by the end of 2028 ⁸. Question: what unemployment rate does the Board judge consistent with full employment under section 9B of the Act, and does it weigh the youth rate? Checkable: answer; the Minutes, 13 October; the next Statement on Monetary Policy ³¹⁴⁹.

G10. The instrument as a living cost. On 11 August the Governor said mortgage holders who see their repayments rise are ‘conflating’ cost of living with inflation, adding ‘But I get why people think th[at]’ ²². The ABS found that in the June quarter employee households had the largest quarterly rise in living costs (1.5 per cent), driven by an 8.2 per cent rise in mortgage interest charges, which the ABS attributes to banks passing on the February, March and May rises ²³. The Bank’s objective in law includes ‘the economic prosperity and welfare of the people of Australia’ ³¹. Question: does the Board count that cost under that objective? Checkable: answer.

G11. Deposits by product. On the Bank’s tables, the average rate paid on all household deposits rose from 2.8 to 3.5 per cent between December 2025 and July 2026, and the average rate charged to owner-occupiers on outstanding variable loans rose from 5.5 to 6.2 per cent: 0.7 points each. At the one-decimal precision published, the gap did not measurably widen, and that compares one loan type with deposits; it is not a bank margin ²⁵. But advertised transaction accounts paid 0.00 per cent in every month from November 2025 to August 2026, bank cash management accounts rose only 0.30 points and one-month term deposits 0.20 points ²⁵. Balances held in each product are not published. Question: will the Bank publish how much is held in each product, so the public can see how many savers got little or none of the rise? Checkable: yes or no.

G12. Reserves. The Bank pays interest on the reserves banks hold with it. Its audited accounts show $12,603 million in 2022/23, $14,651 million in 2023/24 and $9,674 million in 2024/25, which THE RORT’s sum makes about $36.9 billion over the three years. The payment goes to all holders of these accounts, and the Bank does not publish it by institution ²⁷. The other side: the Bank attributes the surge in these balances to its COVID package, naming the Term Funding Facility and the bond purchase program ²⁶. The Bank’s review of the facility says banks passed the lower funding costs through in full, so fixed-rate borrowers were ‘the ultimate beneficiaries’ (the Bank’s claim) ²⁸. The Bank’s accounts also record losses and negative equity since 2021/22, and in July 2022 the Board rejected a government capital injection and chose to rebuild capital from retained earnings ⁵⁴. Since May 2025 the Board no longer announces the rate with its decisions, and the 29 September statement does not state it ²⁶. Question: what rate is in force from 30 September, where is it published, and what did the interest cost in 2025/26? Checkable: answer; the 2026 Annual Report, which was not published on 29 September ²⁷.

G13. The Term Funding Facility. The Bank’s own review says about $4 billion of the facility’s cost came from the Board’s decision in early September 2020 to extend it, when banks had taken up only 60 per cent of their initial allowances, and that this suggested banks did not need the funding to meet borrower demand ²⁸. The other side, from the same review: during the drawdown the funding was about 60 basis points cheaper than bonds for the major banks and cut their average cost of funds by about 5 basis points; between February 2020 and February 2022 the cash rate target fell 65 basis points, the major banks’ funding costs 84 and overall mortgage rates 97; and Bank staff estimate its indirect effects cut mortgage-backed securities yields by about 50 basis points, with the review’s caveat that the facility’s share of lower funding costs is ‘hard to identify’ (a caveat about the wholesale funding effect, not the lending-rate figures) ²⁸. The review also says banks passed the lower funding costs through in full, so fixed-rate borrowers were ‘the ultimate beneficiaries’ (the Bank’s claim) ²⁸. Question: who recommended the extension, and will the Bank support an external review of how the benefits of its pandemic tools divided between bank margins and borrowers? Checkable: answer.

G14. Votes by name. The March rise passed by five votes to four and the May rise by eight to one; the 29 September rise was unanimous ¹⁵². The tally is published at 2.30 pm on decision day but is not attributed to members ⁷, and the Minutes, published two weeks after each meeting, attribute no votes ⁵⁶⁴⁹. Question: will the Board attribute votes to members? Checkable: yes or no; the Minutes, 13 October.

G15. Interests. Only the Governor’s and the Deputy Governor’s declarations of material personal interests are published, and voluntarily. Every member also gives the Treasurer a statement of interests each year, which is confidential ²⁹. The Reserve Bank Act lets a member with a disclosed material personal interest in a monetary policy matter be present and vote, provided the interest was disclosed in writing to the Treasurer within the previous 12 months and has not substantially changed ³¹. The other side, the Board’s Code of Conduct: it bars members and their associated entities from foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives, active trading and any transaction in the blackout period, bars work for a bank, and requires members to advise the Governor of any material interest in a bank or other financial entity ²⁹. Question: in 2026, how many members voted on a monetary policy decision after disclosing a relevant interest to the Treasurer (a number, not names), and will all nine declarations be published? Checkable: answer.

G16. After office. The Board’s Code of Conduct as published has no cooling-off period for work after leaving; its only post-term duty is confidentiality ²⁹. The other side: it does bar members from paid or unpaid work for a bank while they serve ²⁹. THE RORT has not read the Bank’s staff code. Question: does any cooling-off rule apply to a Governor or Deputy Governor who joins a bank or other financial firm after leaving? Checkable: answer, from the staff code or the Bank.

G17. Outside advice. The external Expert Advisory Group first met on 3 June 2026, and only that meeting is listed. The Bank’s progress report says 41 of the Review’s 51 recommendations had been addressed by December 2025 ³⁰. Question: has the Group met since, and did the Board have its advice before 29 September? Checkable: the Group’s meetings page ³⁰.

03To the Treasurer

T1. Supply-shock tools now. The Budget says fiscal policy is better suited than monetary policy to respond to supply shocks such as the oil shock ⁴. The fuel excise cut ended at midnight on 2 August 2026 ⁴⁰. The Bank’s 29 September reasons put the war and energy prices first ¹. The other side: the IMF’s July update says fiscal policy ‘should avoid broad-based subsidies, tax cuts, and price controls’ ¹⁴. Question: what fiscal measure is the government using against the oil shock now? Checkable: the Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook (its date is not in THE RORT’s sources); Supplementary Budget Estimates, 28 and 29 October ⁴⁹.

T2. The roll-off. The ABC reported on 30 March that the Treasurer expected the fuel excise cut to lower headline inflation by half a point through the year to June 2026; that is his claim, not checked against any ABS decomposition. Economists warned, as SBS reported, that the cut could add to inflation through demand ⁴¹. The ABS put July’s 7.5 per cent rise in automotive fuel down to world oil prices and the partial unwinding of the excise relief, and the Bank had itself forecast that the roll-off would lift September-quarter headline inflation ²⁴⁸. Question: has Treasury estimated the roll-off’s effect on September-quarter CPI, and will it publish the estimate? Checkable: 28 October, when the September-quarter CPI is released at 11.30 am AEDT ⁴⁹.

T3. The war framing. On 28 September the Treasurer said inflation is ‘made much worse by the war’ ³⁴ and, as the ABC quoted him, that a big driver ‘comes from the Middle East’ ³⁴³⁶. After the decision, the ABC’s business live blog reported him saying workers ‘didn’t choose this war, but they are paying a hefty price for it’ ³⁵. Set beside that: Treasury’s Final Budget Outcome records June-quarter headline inflation of 3.9 per cent, ‘materially lower’ than the Budget’s 5 per cent forecast, and calls the pass-through of broader Middle East cost pressures to consumer prices ‘subdued’ ⁴²; the Bank puts the war’s indirect effect at a bit more than 0.1 points of June-quarter trimmed mean inflation ⁹. The Bank also puts higher fuel prices at 0.8 points of March’s 4.6 per cent ¹⁰. Question: what share of current inflation does Treasury attribute to the war? Checkable: answer; Supplementary Budget Estimates ⁴⁹.

T4. ‘Our part’, in numbers. The Treasurer says ‘we accept our part’ ³⁴. The government says its Budget is ‘helping to take pressure off inflation’, with real payments growth averaging 1.5 per cent over eight years and payments falling from 26.8 to 26.2 per cent of GDP by 2029-30; that is the government’s claim, and the Budget gives no fiscal impulse figure ³⁹. The New Daily summarised market economists’ view of the 2026-27 settings as ‘neutral to mildly expansionary’; it reported NAB’s Sally Auld saying ‘neutral’ and CBA economists saying the Budget ‘does little to help in the fight against inflation’ ³⁹. Question: what is Treasury’s estimate of the 2026-27 fiscal impulse? Checkable: Supplementary Budget Estimates, 28 and 29 October ⁴⁹.

T5. ‘4 in every 5 dollars’. On 28 September the Treasurer said ‘4 in every 5 dollars of demand came from private demand’, and that spending growth averages 2 per cent a year against 4.1 per cent under the Coalition (2.6 per cent excluding COVID) ³⁴. The Bank’s August Statement records public demand growing 3.6 per cent over the year to June 2026 against household consumption of 1.8 per cent ⁸. Those are growth rates, not shares of demand. The ABC reports that government spending rose from 26.6 to 26.9 per cent of GDP in 2025-26, which it attributes largely to weaker growth ³⁶. Question: over what period and on what measure is the four in five, and will Treasury publish the calculation? Checkable: answer; Supplementary Budget Estimates ⁴⁹.

T6. Profit-side levers. APRA counts bank profit after tax of $42.5 billion in the year to June 2026, up 7.5 per cent. In the March and June quarters, which contained the rises, profit was $20.33 billion against $20.06 billion a year earlier (up 1.4 per cent), and the March quarter bad-debt charge was the highest since at least 2021 ⁴³. A Major Bank Levy already exists: 0.06 per cent a year on certain liabilities of banks with over $100 billion in liabilities. It is a levy on liabilities, not on profits ⁴⁴. The Parliamentary Budget Office assumed 75 per cent of any increase in the levy would be passed on to customers through fees, mortgage rates or lower savings rates ⁴⁴. It costed the Greens’ 2025 ‘Big corporations tax (banks)’, a higher Major Bank Levy plus a levy recouping Term Funding Facility benefits, at about $35.1 billion over the forward estimates; that is a 2025 costing of a party policy, and THE RORT found no 2026 proposal for a bank windfall tax or a higher levy ⁴⁴. Question: has the government considered in 2026 a higher levy or a levy on bank profits, and does it rule one out? Checkable: answer; the House Economics Committee hearing with the four major banks, 12 November; Supplementary Budget Estimates ⁴⁹.

T7. The gas levy modelling. The ABC reported on 20 March that a document from the Prime Minister’s department asked Treasury to model ‘new levy options’ on windfall gas and thermal coal profits ⁴⁵. On 18 June the Treasurer said, ‘When it comes to arrangements around gas taxes, that’s not something that we’ve been working on’ (ABC 7.30, as excerpted in a transcript dated 20 July) ⁴⁶. The other side: Labor senators on the Senate committee recommended a Treasury or Productivity Commission evaluation of the gas tax proposals after the crisis passes and once gas reservation is designed, to avoid ‘damaging vital regional relationships or undermining Australia’s energy and national security’ ⁴⁷. Question: did Treasury complete that modelling, and will the Treasurer publish it? Has the evaluation Labor’s senators recommended been commissioned? Checkable: answer; Supplementary Budget Estimates ⁴⁹.

T8. Company tax and PRRT from the war. Treasury officials told the Senate committee, as quoted in the Greens’ additional comments, that higher prices ‘would also directly translate through to higher corporate tax paid’ ⁴⁷. The committee found that a lack of ‘timely, transparent entity-level data’ makes it difficult to understand revenue, profits and Petroleum Resource Rent Tax ⁴⁷. Question: how much extra company tax and PRRT has been received from LNG exporters since the conflict began? Checkable: answer; Supplementary Budget Estimates ⁴⁹.

T9. The override. The Reserve Bank Review recommended removing the Treasurer’s power to override the Bank, and the Bank’s own progress report records that the government did not implement that; section 11 survived the 2024 reforms, with the override running through the Governor-General in Council and the order tabled in Parliament ³⁰. The Treasurer had first accepted the recommendation, the ABC reported ³². The other side, as the ABC reported in February 2024: former governors and treasurers of both parties (Macfarlane, Fraser, Costello, Keating) argued to keep it as a democratic check, and the reviewer Gordon de Brouwer said it had never been used (an ABC paraphrase) ³². Question: why was it kept? Checkable: answer.

T10. Appointments. Four of the six first external members of the Monetary Policy Board (Hewson, Harper, Ross and Watkins) were carried over from the old Reserve Bank Board after ‘consultation’, not appointed through the new open process; only Baker and Fry-McKibbin were new ³³. External members are chosen on the advice of a panel that includes two of the Board’s own voters, the Governor and the Treasury Secretary, plus one outsider. The other side: that is by design, because the Review recommended it ³³. Bruce Preston, a member since 1 March 2026, was appointed on the advice of a panel of the Treasury Secretary, the Governor and Martin Parkinson; the shortlist drew on the 2024 expression-of-interest process and the Opposition was consulted ⁵⁵. Carolyn Hewson’s term is the next to expire, on 28 February 2027 ⁷. Question: why were four members carried over, and will the next appointment follow the open process? Checkable: 28 February 2027 ⁷.

T11. Declarations. Every member’s annual statement of interests goes to the Treasurer in confidence, and only the Governor’s and the Deputy Governor’s declarations are published ²⁹. Section 7D of the Act lets a member vote on a matter in which they have a disclosed material personal interest ³¹. The other side: the Code of Conduct’s safeguards on trading, blackout periods, derivatives and work for a bank ²⁹. Question: will the Treasurer publish the statements, or a count of the disclosures under which members have voted? Checkable: answer.

T12. Electricity relief. The Commonwealth Energy Bill Relief Fund extension paid relief from 1 July 2024 to 31 December 2025; the agreement’s formal end date is 31 December 2026, but nothing THE RORT found says relief is paid in 2026 ⁵⁰. The ABS attributes electricity’s 6.1 per cent annual rise to July 2026 ‘largely’ to the end of Commonwealth and state rebates ²⁴. Question: is any Commonwealth electricity relief being paid in 2026? Checkable: answer; 31 December 2026, the agreement’s formal end ⁵⁰; Supplementary Budget Estimates ⁴⁹.

T13. Banks and unfair pricing. From 1 July 2026 excessive grocery pricing by ‘very large retailers’ (over $30 billion in revenue, currently Coles and Woolworths) is prohibited, tested as ‘significantly excessive’ against cost plus a reasonable margin; no enforcement outcome has been checked ⁵¹. The Unfair Trading Practices Bill, passed on 2 July 2026, bans subscription traps, undisclosed checkout fees and manipulative online design from 1 July 2027; for financial services the government is only exploring ‘further alignment’ with ASIC and the states, so the ban does not yet squarely cover banks ⁵¹. Question: will an excessive-pricing or unfair-trading test apply to banking products, and when? Checkable: answer; 1 July 2027 ⁵¹.

T14. Unemployment. The Treasurer says ‘we’re not for higher unemployment’ and that the government recognises the Bank’s independence ³⁴. The Bank forecasts unemployment rising to 4.8 per cent by the end of 2028 ⁸, and the Governor said on 22 September, ‘I think between 4.5 and 5 will probably take enough heat out of the labor market that it’ll ease pressure on inflation’, while also saying ‘high unemployment is not great’ ¹⁷. Question: does the government accept that path, and if not, what will it do? Checkable: the Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook; Supplementary Budget Estimates ⁴⁹.

04To the Prime Minister

P1. The levy study. The ABC reported on 10 May that the Prime Minister ‘killed off the move, concerned it could upset the trading partners Australia is relying on for fuel’; that is the reporter’s characterisation, not a government quote ⁴⁵. The Prime Minister’s own reasons, as quoted in the ABC’s federal politics live blog on 29 April: ‘The middle of a global fuel crisis is the worst possible time to jeopardise these partnerships, or the investment that underpins them’ ⁴⁶. Question: is the ABC’s account accurate, and on what advice was the decision made? Checkable: answer.

P2. Reconsidering after the conflict. The Senate Select Committee on the Taxation of Gas Resources, in its report of 7 May, could not agree a set of recommendations and invited the government to reconsider the issue ‘following the resolution of the current conflict in Iran’ ⁴⁷. The Prime Minister, as reported by SBS on 24 April, said gas companies ‘pay around about $22 billion’ and that ‘you need to acknowledge the tens of billions of dollars of investment that occurs in order to have that gas extracted’ ⁴⁶. Question: when, and on what test, will the government reconsider? Checkable: answer; any formal government response to the committee’s 7 May report (THE RORT has found none).

P3. ‘Look at measures’. On 29 September, before the decision, the Prime Minister said: ‘We’ll continue to look at measures, but we’ll continue also to bear in mind that any measure we don’t want to have a further impact on inflation. And to bear in mind the fiscal position that that represents’ ³⁷. Question: which measures are under consideration? Checkable: answer; the Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook.

P4. Two wars. The Prime Minister said: ‘We’ve had two wars, to be fair, that have impacted on the price of fuel’ ³⁷. On the Bank’s split, higher fuel prices were 0.8 points of March’s 4.6 per cent ¹⁰, and the government’s own Final Budget Outcome calls the pass-through of broader Middle East cost pressures to consumer prices ‘subdued’ ⁴². Question: what else, in the government’s view, is keeping inflation above target? Checkable: answer.

05To the Opposition

O1. ‘An increased tax take’. Coalition senators on the Senate committee recommended ‘no arbitrary taxation such as a windfall levy on gas exports’ and said Australia ‘needs an increased tax take, not an increased tax rate’. They cited disregarded evidence, undisclosed conflicts of interest from fossil fuel activism, rushed reporting (24 hours to respond to the Chair’s draft) and the global energy crisis ⁴⁷. Question: what measure would raise the take from LNG exporters, and by how much? Checkable: answer; a Parliamentary Budget Office costing.

O2. The House vote. On 2 June the House of Representatives negatived, 9 votes to 71, Elizabeth Watson-Brown’s second-reading amendment calling for ‘a 25 per cent gas export tax’. No Coalition member appears on either list, and there is no party count of the 71; the government’s members voted it down and the Coalition did not vote ⁴⁸. Coalition senators’ stated position on a gas export levy is at O1 ⁴⁷. Question: why did the Coalition not vote? Checkable: answer.

O3. ‘The 16th time’. The Shadow Treasurer’s release says the Bank was ‘forced to raise interest rates’ for ‘the 16th time under the Albanese Labor government’ ³⁸. The count is the Opposition’s claim; THE RORT has not recomputed it. Yahoo Finance’s live blog noted that the hiking cycle ‘actually commenced under Scott Morrison’ ³⁸. Question: how is the count made? Checkable: answer.

O4. ‘We’d be in surplus’. On 28 September, as reported in the ABC’s federal politics live blog, the Opposition Leader, Angus Taylor, said: ‘If the government had just offset their extra spends since they’ve come to government, we’d be in surplus right now’. The claim is not costed ³⁸. The government’s other side: it ran underlying cash surpluses of $22.1 billion in 2022-23 and $15.8 billion in 2023-24 ⁵³. Since then the budget has been in deficit: $10.0 billion in 2024-25 and $22.3 billion in 2025-26 ⁴², and the 2026-27 Budget forecasts a deficit of $31.5 billion ⁴. Question: is there a costing? Checkable: answer; a Parliamentary Budget Office costing.

O5. Which spending. The Opposition blames the government’s ‘spending addiction’ and ‘active inflation agenda’ ³⁸. Question: which specific spending would it cut, and by how much would that lower inflation? Checkable: answer.

06The calendar of answers

These are the dates on which the public record can settle the questions. The graphic above shows them in order. Dates marked ‘on precedent’ follow the Bank’s habit of publishing Minutes two weeks after each meeting; verify each on the day ⁴⁹.

7 October 2026. The desk next reviews answers. Any of the forty, if answered.

13 October. Minutes of the 29 September meeting, 11.30 am: G1, G5, G6, G9, G14 ⁴⁹.

28 October. ABS September-quarter CPI, 11.30 am AEDT, and Supplementary Budget Estimates (Economics), day 1: T1, T2, T3, T4, T5, T6, T7, T8, T12, T14 and G1 ⁴⁹.

29 October. Supplementary Budget Estimates, day 2: the same questions, if not reached on 28 October ⁴⁹.

3 November. Board decision, 2.30 pm, and the Governor’s media conference: G2, G3, G4, G8 ⁴⁹.

12 November. House Economics Committee, the review of the four major banks: T6 ⁴⁹.

17 November (on precedent). Minutes of the 3 November meeting: the 13 October questions, if still open ⁴⁹.

8 December. The last Board decision of 2026, 2.30 pm: G8 ⁴⁹.

22 December (on precedent). Minutes of the 8 December meeting: the 13 October questions, if still open ⁴⁹.

31 December. The formal end of the Energy Bill Relief extension agreement: T12 ⁵⁰.

28 February 2027. Carolyn Hewson’s term on the Board ends: T10 ⁷.

1 July 2027. The Unfair Trading Practices ban starts: T13 ⁵¹.

Each question will later gain its own dated update, with the answer, or with ‘No answer had been published by’ the date. Until then all forty are open.

If it’s a rort, we cover it.