A global war, a national rate
The Reserve Bank does not deny the war: every statement since March names it, and today's puts it first. But its Governor says the rises 'will have no impact' on the oil-driven inflation, and on its own numbers fuel added 0.8 points to M…
On Tuesday 29 September 2026 the Reserve Bank's Monetary Policy Board raised the cash rate target by 25 basis points to 4.60 per cent, effective 30 September. It was the fourth rise of 2026, the four total 100 basis points from 3.60 per cent, and the decision was unanimous 12.
Three questions sit behind this article. Is the Reserve Bank pretending the Middle East war is not driving prices? How can a national interest rate fight a shock that began on the other side of the world? And when other central banks raise rates too, does that make it right?
The record answers each of them, and none of the answers is simple. The Bank does not deny the war: the statements of 17 March, 5 May, 16 June, 11 August and 29 September each name the conflict, and today's puts it first 34561. But its Governor said in May that the rate rises "will have no impact" on the inflation the oil shock causes directly, and on the Bank's own split fuel added 0.8 percentage points to March's 4.6 per cent 78. The Bank's answer is that the rises are aimed at something else: domestic inflation that was already there before the war, and the risk that the shock spreads. Other central banks faced the same war. Some raised, some held, and of those checked the Reserve Bank raised the most. Both cases are set out below in the documents' own words.
01What the Bank says caused it
After the decision itself, today's statement begins: "Inflation remains elevated and some of the upside risks flagged in August are materialising." The first cause it names is the war: "The conflict in the Middle East has broadened and global energy prices are now much higher than had been assumed in the August forecasts." Later, explaining the decision, it says: "Higher fuel prices have partially been passed through to prices of other goods and services. This inflation impulse is in addition to the effect of capacity pressures in the economy." 1
The statement also names a second global force, which it names separately from the war. "AI-related demand is driving rapid growth in global prices for technology-related goods." And it says "growth in Australia's major trading partners has been stronger than expected, as the boost from AI-related investment has outweighed the adverse effects of the Middle East conflict." 1
After the war and AI, it turns home: "And there remains pressure on domestic capacity." The rise, it says, is because "a further tightening in financial conditions is warranted to support a return of inflation to target in a reasonable period." 1
The war has been in every decision statement since March. On 17 March: "the conflict in the Middle East has resulted in sharply higher fuel prices, which, if sustained, will add to inflation." 3 On 5 May: "Higher fuel prices are adding to inflation and there are indications that this is likely to have second-round effects on prices for goods and services more broadly. This inflation impulse is in addition to the high inflation recorded around the start of 2026, reflecting capacity pressures in the economy." 4 On 16 June: "As expected, the disruption to global oil supply is having an impact on inflation." 5 On 11 August: "While the impact of the Middle East conflict on inflation has so far been less than expected, headline inflation is still too high." 6
The May, June, August and September statements each set the war's effect beside domestic capacity pressure. The rest of this article asks how much weight each carries, and what a rate can do about each.
02The war and the timing
The war began at the end of February. The International Energy Agency dates the United States and Israeli air strikes on Iran to 28 February, and the U.S. Energy Information Administration records the "de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz" that followed 910. The Reserve Bank's first 2026 rise was decided on 3 February (announced 3 February, effective 4 February). By THE RORT's count the war began 25 days after that decision.
The February statement argued the rise on domestic grounds: "it is evident that private demand is growing more quickly than expected, capacity pressures are greater than previously assessed and labour market conditions are a little tight". It does not mention the Middle East, oil, fuel, gas or energy. It did say global uncertainty "remains significant" 11. The war is not a reason the Bank gave for the February rise, and this article does not offer it as one.
Inflation was already above the Bank's 2 to 3 per cent target band before the war. Underlying inflation was 3.4 per cent over the year to the December quarter 2025, and the ABS recorded monthly headline inflation of 3.7 per cent in the year to February 2026 1213.
The oil shock itself was large. Brent crude began 2026 at US$61 a barrel and finished the March quarter at US$118 (front-month futures), a quarterly rise the EIA called "the largest on an inflation-adjusted basis in data going back to 1988" 10. The IEA reported on 12 March that Brent had traded "within a whisker of $120/bbl" before easing to about US$92, with "nearly 20 mb/d of crude and product exports currently disrupted": the position that day, not the peak 9. The Reserve Bank's May Minutes estimated the disruptions had cut global oil supply by around 10 per cent and LNG by around 20 per cent, and in the next sentence noted that "the real price of oil was still well below the levels it had reached on several prior occasions, including following Russia's invasion of Ukraine." 14
Oil then moved both ways. The June statement said "Oil prices have eased in recent weeks, although energy and most related commodity prices remain higher than they were prior to the conflict in the Middle East" 5. Today's says "global energy prices are now much higher than had been assumed in the August forecasts." 1 The EIA reports Brent averaging US$91 in August, US$7 above July, partly on "the renewal of the U.S. blockade on Iran's oil exports", and forecasts about US$90 for the second half of 2026 and US$77 by the June quarter 2027. Those are forecasts 15.
03How much of it is the war, on the Bank's own numbers
March was the war month, and fuel drove the monthly jump: the ABS recorded regular unleaded petrol up 33 per cent and diesel up 41 per cent in the month. But the same release names Housing, "the highest weighted group in the CPI", as "the largest contributor to annual inflation in March, with a rise of 6.5 per cent". Monthly trimmed mean inflation was unchanged at 3.3 per cent 13.
The Bank's own split of that peak is in its May Statement on Monetary Policy: "headline inflation increased to 4.6 per cent in March, with the higher fuel prices contributing 0.8 percentage points". Quarterly trimmed mean inflation was 3.5 per cent over the year to the March quarter, "although it only captured one month of the conflict" 8.
The Budget, on 12 May, described the same figure differently: "Headline inflation rose to 4.6 per cent in the 12 months to March 2026, driven by a 32.8 per cent rise in automotive fuel prices in the month." That is the Budget's wording. Set beside it the ABS's finding that Housing was the largest contributor to annual inflation in March, and the Bank's split of 0.8 points for fuel. The Budget also forecast headline inflation of 5 per cent through the year to the June quarter 16. The outcome was 3.9 per cent, which the Bank said was "substantially lower than the 4.8 per cent expected in the May Statement", "primarily" because fuel and travel prices were weaker than expected, "reflecting both global developments and lower retail margins for petrol" 17. Treasury's Final Budget Outcome of 28 September records the same 3.9 per cent, "materially lower than the forecast of 5 per cent in the 2026-27 Budget", and calls the pass-through of broader Middle East cost pressures to consumer prices "subdued" 18.
The Bank has also put a number on the war's indirect effect. Its August Statement judged that "conflict-related cost effects (excluding the direct effect of retail fuel prices) contributed a bit more than 0.1 percentage points to trimmed mean inflation in the June quarter", a little less than it expected in May, "although this estimate is uncertain." The same section is careful in the other direction: trimmed mean inflation of 3.6 per cent over the year reflected "ongoing economy-wide capacity pressures and the pass-through of higher costs as a result of the Middle East conflict". Trimmed mean is not a war-free measure. THE RORT found no Reserve Bank figure for the direct fuel contribution to June-quarter headline inflation 17.
The ABS splits annual inflation into tradables and non-tradables. In February, before the war, they stood at 1.3 and 5.0 per cent. In March they were 4.5 and 4.6. In July they were 1.7 and 4.4 19. THE RORT's reading: the non-tradables part was high before the war and remains the larger part, while the tradables part spiked in the war month and was then damped, partly by the fuel excise cut.
The fuel path adds context. Automotive fuel rose 32.8 per cent in March, fell 7.0 per cent in April, and the ABS notes that the April fall "includes the halving of the fuel excise on 1 April"; fuel was still 23.5 per cent above February. It was up 18.6 per cent in the year to April, having been down 7.2 per cent a year in February, before the war. The ABS also gave fuel as an example of an item excluded from the trimmed mean in both March and April 20. In June fuel fell 10.9 per cent: "Lower world oil prices as a result of some stabilisation in the Middle East in June" 21. The ABS Transport group rose only 1.6 per cent in the year to July 19.
Energy prices abroad rose again after May. The Bank's August Statement records Asian LNG prices up around 20 per cent and European natural gas up around 18 per cent since May, "on restocking demand in Europe ahead of winter and concerns over future supply availability" 17. The June Resources and Energy Quarterly says the conflict "has flipped LNG markets from expected oversupply to expected undersupply for the next 2-3 years" 22.
04What a national rate cannot do
The recent increases in interest rates will have no impact on this. What these increases do, however, is to help to contain the domestic inflationary pressures after the inflation due to oil and related commodity prices eases.
That is the Governor, on 5 May, about the inflation the oil shock was already causing: "Already we've seen a sharp increase in fuel and related commodity prices and this is already feeding through to inflation." At the same conference: "these interest rates rises are not going to do anything for inflation in the next six months. That's done and dusted." 7
Asked about the most vulnerable, she said: "The shock with oil prices, there's nothing we can do about that. And as I said earlier, the interest rate rises will not do anything about that. That is going to happen." ("That is going to happen" refers to the first-round price rise.) And: "it's a real income shock for Australia and the world. Australians are poorer because of this shock to oil prices and energy prices and all the other commodity prices that are being impacted. We are poorer and there is no way out of that." 7
Asked whether there was "a better way to deal with, largely oil shock-driven inflation", she answered: "the oil shock is not the sole reason why we are - we had an inflation problem before this. People often say to me, you must have a - well, you must have a better thing than the interest rate, we don't. It's all we have. And we know that it affects different people differently. We know that. But it's the only thing we have to address inflation." 7 She also said the Bank does "look through" the first effects: "we can look through the initial impact. The indirect impact, if you like, on the costs of other businesses. And then we're looking for it to stop there. And any indications that it's not stopping there is the worry." 7
The Board said the same in its May Minutes: "monetary policy could not prevent a near-term increase in the price level as higher fuel prices worked their way through to final prices", and "monetary policy could not alter the near-term trajectory of inflation and, additionally, that output growth would likely be lower than potential growth for some time." What it could do was "limit the risk that this cost shock resulted in a broader and sustained lift in inflationary pressure, by bringing aggregate demand into closer alignment with aggregate supply and ensuring medium- to longer term inflation expectations remained anchored." 14
The Governor made a related point at CEDA on 22 September: "these shocks to the supply side of the economy are very difficult for monetary policy to deal with. Monetary policy can deal with demand shocks ... But the supply side of the economy, when you get a supply shock, your trade-off worsens." She said policy must be set "in a way that minimises the second-round and indirect effects which might perpetuate ongoing inflation" 23.
On 28 July she gave two limits of a different kind. Slow productivity growth is something monetary policy "can't" address, and while it persists "Australians will continue to experience limited growth in real wages": she tied that to productivity, not to the rate stance. And she said "a given increase in oil prices has a less direct and less pervasive effect on inflation today than it would have in the 1970s" 24.
Other central banks say it of their own rates. The Bank of England's September Minutes: "Monetary policy could not influence global energy prices, but was being set to ensure that the economic adjustment to them occurred in a way that achieved the 2% inflation target sustainably" 25. Norges Bank, which like Australia is an energy exporter with mostly variable-rate mortgages, put it this way in May:
Of course, Norges Bank cannot influence global prices, but that does not mean we can disregard them in the conduct of monetary policy.
05Why the Board tightened anyway
The Board's argument is that a rate cannot change the oil price but can change what happens next. The Minutes for March and May show the argument being made, and contested inside the Board.
In March the vote was 5 to 4 to raise. The majority held that developments in the Middle East "would further reduce the already constrained supply capacity of the Australian economy, increasing inflationary pressures for any given level of aggregate demand", and "would add to global and domestic inflation under a wide range of scenarios". It warned that "if medium- and long-term inflation expectations increased, it would ultimately require significantly more contractionary monetary policy". The same majority noted that the impact of the conflict on demand "remains uncertain, given Australia's position as a net energy exporter and households' generally healthy balance sheets." 26
The four-member minority "reiterated that inflation was too high and that a further tightening in monetary policy would probably be required". But they placed more weight on weak consumption and slowing unit labour costs, and "felt there was merit in delaying any tightening of monetary policy until the potential effects of the current conflict in the Middle East become clearer." 26 Both dissents in 2026, March and May, were about timing, not about the tool.
In May the vote was 8 to 1. The lone dissenter judged that pre-war capacity pressures were "somewhat less than the staff had assessed", preferred to hold "while awaiting additional evidence on how the Australian economy would respond to the conflict", and "noted that this approach was consistent with that adopted by other central banks." In setting out the case for holding, the Minutes record that "several other central banks had chosen to hold their policy rates unchanged pending greater clarity", and that "given monetary policy had already been tightened twice in 2026, waiting for a clearer assessment of how the conflict might affect economic activity could be an appropriate course of action." The majority nonetheless judged that a rise "would best balance the Board's two objectives, accepting that the shorter term trade-off between these had worsened." 14 The Minutes attribute no votes to named members.
Since then the Bank has kept returning to second-round effects and capacity. In June it said its aim was "ensuring that inflation does not become embedded once the impulse from higher oil prices has passed through", and that "growth in demand needs to slow to reduce capacity pressures" 5. Assistant Governor Sarah Hunter set out a general test on 8 July, a framework rather than a verdict on this shock: looking through a supply shock "is only appropriate if policymakers are confident that the shock will not be persistent, that second-round effects will be limited and that inflation expectations will remain anchored", and "When the economy is operating beyond its sustainable capacity, underlying inflation is above-target and we are on a steep part of the Phillips curve, firms may be more likely to pass on changes" 27.
To the House Economics Committee on 18 September the Governor said: "The increase in inflation partly reflects capacity pressures in the Australian economy, and the conflict in the Middle East has added to these inflation pressures." She said "many firms have passed input cost pressures arising from elevated fuel prices through to the prices of other goods and services", that the labour market is "a little tighter than" full employment, and that "Because monetary policy works with a lag, the full effects of recent rate increases are yet to be felt." 28 Today's statement adds that the Bank's liaison finds firms "either increasing the prices of their goods and services or looking to do so", and that "Short-term measures of inflation expectations remain elevated." 1
On 11 August she put the question herself: "How do you react to these supply shocks? ... I think you've seen we have reacted firstly to the excess demand. We have also been reacting to what's been going on in the supply shock ... we have limited ability to completely ignore any future supply shocks." 29 The Governor's own account, then, is that the first reaction was to excess demand.
06What other central banks did
Scale, not direction, sets the Reserve Bank apart. Of the central banks THE RORT checked, the Reserve Bank has tightened most in 2026 and has the highest policy rate. The 2026 moves, from the banks' own decisions: Reserve Bank of Australia +100 basis points to 4.60 per cent; Norges Bank +50 to 4.50; European Central Bank +50 (deposit rate 2.50); Bank of Japan +50 (about 1.25); Federal Reserve +25 (3.75 to 4.00); Bank of England no change (3.75); Bank of Canada no change (2.25). The Swiss National Bank held at 0 per cent in September, and the Riksbank left its rate at 1.75 per cent at its August and September decisions; their earlier 2026 decisions were not checked. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand is left out of the tally because its 2026 decisions could not be verified. THE RORT's tally is from the primary decisions cited below 30312532333435.
The Reserve Bank's own June Minutes noted that the ECB and Norges Bank "had both raised interest rates to contain the second-round effects of higher oil prices and address broader concerns about above-target inflation." 36
Federal Reserve. It held at 3.50 to 3.75 per cent at every meeting through July, with three members wanting a rise in July, then raised to 3.75 to 4.00 per cent on 16 September by 12 votes to 0, its first rise since July 2023. Its April, June and July statements named energy and the Middle East conflict; the September text names only "geopolitical developments" 30. US inflation was 3.4 per cent in the year to August, with core at 2.4 per cent, energy up 16.3 per cent and gasoline up 27.4 per cent. The Fed raised with core at 2.4 per cent 37.
European Central Bank. It held in March, April and July, and raised by 25 basis points in June and again in September, naming the Middle East war both times: "The conflict in the Middle East continues to generate inflation pressures, and inflation is set to remain well above target for an extended period." 31 Euro-area inflation was 3.2 per cent in August, with energy at 14.3 per cent and core at 2.4 per cent, so the ECB raised twice with core at 2.4 to 2.5 per cent 38. President Lagarde's March speech, which is not a Governing Council decision, said a limited, short-lived energy shock should be looked through, but that the response "does not depend only on its origin" but "also on its magnitude and persistence", and that "pass-through is measurably stronger when capacity utilisation is high and unemployment is low" 39.
Bank of England. It held Bank Rate at 3.75 per cent at every meeting through September. The votes: February 5 to 4, with four members voting to cut, a split that predates the war; March unanimous; April 8 to 1; June 7 to 2; July 6 to 3; September 6 to 3, with three members voting to raise 25. UK inflation was 3.1 per cent in August. The Bank projects about 3.75 per cent in the December quarter and slightly above 4 per cent in the March quarter 2027, with about 0.7 points of the 1.1-point overshoot from direct energy effects. It relies on "weakness in economic activity and soft labour market conditions" to contain second-round effects 25. The Reserve Bank's statement says Australia still has "pressure on domestic capacity" 1.
Bank of Canada. It held at 2.25 per cent on 2 September, its seventh hold in a row, naming the Middle East conflict, and saw "little evidence of higher energy prices spreading to other components of inflation". Canadian inflation was 3.0 per cent in August, with the Bank's core measures CPI-trim at 1.9 and CPI-median at 2.0 32.
Bank of Japan. It raised to about 1.0 per cent on 16 June (7 votes to 1), citing oil price pass-through "progressing at a relatively fast pace in business-to-business transactions", and to about 1.25 per cent on 18 September (7 to 2). Japan's inflation was 1.9 per cent in August, held down by government energy subsidies 33.
Norges Bank. It raised twice, to 4.25 per cent (decided 6 May, announced 7 May) and to 4.50 per cent (decided 23 September, announced 24 September), citing the war's effect on oil and gas. In September it said underlying inflation had slowed and was lower than projected 34.
Riksbank and Swiss National Bank. The Riksbank left its rate at 1.75 per cent on 24 September but signalled rises "this year", saying "The supply shocks from the war in the Middle East remain and global cost pressures are still elevated". The SNB held at 0 per cent the same day; Swiss inflation rose to 0.8 per cent in August, mainly on oil products. Eurostat records Sweden's August inflation at 0.3 per cent, the lowest in the EU 3538.
New Zealand's CPI was 4.1 per cent in the year to the June 2026 quarter, with petrol up 27.5 per cent the largest contributor. That is a price figure only; the Reserve Bank of New Zealand's decisions are not verified here 40. Australia's own headline CPI was 3.5 per cent in the year to July 19. The months differ across these countries, and each figure is that country's own headline measure.
So "others hiked too" is context, not justification, and it is not universal. The Bank of England and the Bank of Canada held all year. The Federal Reserve raised only in September, and by 25 basis points. The Governor herself noted on 18 September that "central banks in many other advanced economies are responding to this global inflation shock by increasing their policy rates or signalling they will do so if needed." 28 Whether the size of the Australian response is right is the question the peers do not settle.
07What the referees say
The International Monetary Fund's April outlook, "Global Economy in the Shadow of War", projected global growth of 3.1 per cent in 2026 and 3.2 per cent in 2027. In an adverse scenario growth slows to 2.5 per cent and inflation reaches 5.4 per cent; in a severe one growth is about 2 per cent and headline inflation just above 6 per cent by 2027. Its guidance is conditional: "Monetary policymakers should reserve the option to look through negative supply shocks" ... "as long as inflation expectations remain well anchored and the monetary policy stance is already properly calibrated" 41. Whether the Reserve Bank's stance was "already properly calibrated" when the war hit is a question this article cannot answer from the record. It is not THE RORT's verdict either way.
The IMF's July update, which put global growth at 3.0 per cent in 2026 and 3.4 per cent in 2027, sets out a general rule that bears on the Bank's position. It said that where inflationary pressures are judged temporary and expectations anchored, "central banks should keep real rates broadly constant over a reasonable horizon, which may imply raising nominal policy rates". Where technology-led demand adds pressure, "central banks may need to do more to avoid overheating". It added: "fiscal policy should avoid broad-based subsidies, tax cuts, and price controls" 42.
The Bank for International Settlements said in June that "policymakers must prioritise price stability". Research by BIS staff, published on 5 August and reflecting their views, not the BIS's, found that "When expectations are above target, the inflationary impact of oil supply shocks can be more than twice as large as when they are well anchored", that "an energy price surge combined with a loose fiscal position tends to be followed by higher inflation", and that prompt responses cost less where activity is resilient 43.
A BIS economic adviser, Hyun Song Shin, was reported by Reuters, as carried by Global Banking & Finance Review, on 16 March, the day before the Reserve Bank's March rise, as saying:
If it's a supply shock, and certainly if it's a temporary one, these are the textbook examples where you should look through and not react with monetary policy.
He added: "It really depends on how long the conflict lasts and how long the rise in the oil price will be sustained." These are remarks reported via Reuters, not a BIS publication 44.
08The other side, and what is still open
The case for the Board, in the documents' own words. Inflation was above target before the war 1213. The March majority judged that the war would add to inflation "under a wide range of scenarios" and that expectations rising would "ultimately require significantly more contractionary monetary policy" 26. The Governor says many firms have passed fuel costs on and that the labour market is "a little tighter than" full employment 28. The IMF says holding real rates steady through a temporary shock "may imply raising nominal policy rates" 42, and BIS staff find oil shocks bite harder when expectations are above target 43. Fed, ECB, Bank of Japan and Norges Bank all raised 30313334.
The Governor's case for acting now, on 28 July: "Putting off a period of tight monetary policy today can mean higher rates and higher unemployment down the track." 24 Her predecessor Philip Lowe said in 2022 that bringing inflation down once it is ingrained in expectations "is very costly and almost certainly involves a recession", and that in Australia and the US in the 1970s and 1980s it took "a rise in the unemployment rate of at least 5 percentage points" 45.
Arguments that cut the other way, from inside the Board. Member Iain Ross, speaking in his own name on 22 September and not for the Board, said: "The overall thesis is that there is no evidence of the emergence of a wage-price spiral in the present circumstances and recent data suggest such an outcome is unlikely." He said the 1970s mechanisms (comparative wage justice, quarterly indexation) are gone and that enterprise agreements lock wages until expiry 46. He spoke in his own name on 22 September; whether he attended today's meeting will be known when the Minutes are published on 13 October. That cuts against a wage-price spiral as a justification for tightening in 2026. It does not address the Board's argument from capacity and expectations. The minority in March and the dissenter in May, described above, preferred to hold or to delay, not to abandon the tool 2614.
What the record leaves open. The Reserve Bank has not published, in the documents THE RORT has read, a split of the 2026 rises between war pass-through and domestic capacity. It gives a bit more than 0.1 point for the war's indirect effect on one quarter's trimmed mean, and 0.8 points for fuel's direct contribution to March's headline, but no split of the policy response 178. Whether it judged its stance "already properly calibrated", the IMF's condition, when the war hit is likewise not answered in that record.
The Minutes of today's meeting are listed for 13 October at 11.30 am, and the Board's next decision is on 3 November at 2.30 pm, followed by the Governor's media conference 47. Any answer or fact that changes what is written above will be added here as a dated Update.
If it's a rort, we cover it.
- Review: one year after publicationThe authored watch rows suppress this article's yearly review cadence; this row replaces it.
Read the desk note
REVIEW 29 September 2027 (case: THE INFLATION RORT). Re-read this article against the record a year after publication: every dated note, every figure marked as a forecast, and every claim still marked open. NEXT DATE: none set.
- Watch: Monetary Policy Board decision, 2.30 pmThe next decision, followed by the Governor's media conference.
Read the desk note
WATCH 3 November 2026 (case: THE INFLATION RORT). Decision at 2.30 pm and the Governor's media conference. Record the rate, the vote, and whether the statement still puts the war first and how it describes domestic capacity. NEXT DATE: 8 December 2026, the last Board decision of 2026.
- Watch: Minutes of the 29 September meeting, 11.30 amThe RBA's release calendar lists the Minutes for 13 October at 11.30 am.
Read the desk note
WATCH 13 October 2026 (case: THE INFLATION RORT). The Minutes of the 29 September meeting are listed for 11.30 am. Check: attendance; the war's pass-through; peers; the case for holding, if any member preferred to hold and why. NEXT DATE: 3 November 2026, Board decision.
- Record: article 10 published, 29 September 2026Published the day the Reserve Bank raised the cash rate to 4.60 per cent, unanimously.
Read the desk note
PUBLISHED 29 September 2026 (case: THE INFLATION RORT, article 10).
FINDING. The RBA names the war first; its Governor said in May the rises will have no impact on the oil-driven inflation; on its own numbers fuel added 0.8 points to March's 4.6 per cent and the war's indirect effect a bit more than 0.1 point to June-quarter trimmed mean; of the central banks checked it moved most in 2026.
STILL OPEN. The RBA's split of the 2026 rises between war pass-through and domestic capacity (not published in the documents read).
NEXT DATE: 13 October 2026, Minutes.
- RBA: Media Release 2026-27, Monetary Policy Decision, 29 September 2026, 14:30 AEST. https://www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/2026/mr-26-27.html. The Board decided to increase the cash rate target by 25 basis points to 4.60 per cent; "Today's policy decision was unanimous." Reasons quoted: "The conflict in the Middle East has broadened and global energy prices are now much higher than had been assumed in the August forecasts."; "Higher fuel prices have partially been passed through to prices of other goods and services. This inflation impulse is in addition to the effect of capacity pressures in the economy."; "AI-related demand is driving rapid growth in global prices for technology-related goods."; "growth in Australia's major trading partners has been stronger than expected, as the boost from AI-related investment has outweighed the adverse effects of the Middle East conflict."; "Inflation remains elevated and some of the upside risks flagged in August are materialising."; "And there remains pressure on domestic capacity."; "a further tightening in financial conditions is warranted to support a return of inflation to target in a reasonable period."; "Liaison indicates that firms are experiencing cost pressures and are either increasing the prices of their goods and services or looking to do so."; "Short-term measures of inflation expectations remain elevated."
- RBA: cash rate target table. https://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/cash-rate/. Fetched 29 September 2026, 14:37 AEST. Effective dates: 13 Aug 2025 3.60; 4 Feb 2026 3.85; 18 Mar 2026 4.10; 6 May 2026 4.35; 17 Jun 2026 4.35 (held); 12 Aug 2026 4.35 (held); 30 Sep 2026 4.60. The table lists effective dates, with "any change in the cash rate target taking effect the following day". At 4.60 per cent the cash rate is above the 2023 peak of 4.35 per cent and at its highest since late 2011 (4.75 per cent until a cut effective 2 November 2011). The four 2026 rises total 100 basis points from 3.60 per cent.
- RBA: Media Release 2026-08, 17 March 2026. https://www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/2026/mr-26-08.html. "Today's policy decision was made by majority: five members voted to increase the cash rate target by 25 basis points to 4.10 per cent; four members voted to leave the cash rate target unchanged at 3.85 per cent." "the conflict in the Middle East has resulted in sharply higher fuel prices, which, if sustained, will add to inflation."
- RBA: Media Release 2026-12, 5 May 2026. https://www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/2026/mr-26-12.html. Eight members voted to increase the cash rate target by 25 basis points to 4.35 per cent; one voted to leave it at 4.10 per cent. "Higher fuel prices are adding to inflation and there are indications that this is likely to have second-round effects on prices for goods and services more broadly. This inflation impulse is in addition to the high inflation recorded around the start of 2026, reflecting capacity pressures in the economy." The phrase "second-round effects" appears once in the 2026 decision statements, in this one.
- RBA: Media Release 2026-15, 16 June 2026. https://www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/2026/mr-26-15.html. Held at 4.35 per cent, unanimously. "As expected, the disruption to global oil supply is having an impact on inflation. Higher fuel prices have added directly to inflation and there are indications that this is passing through to the prices of other goods and services, so inflation is likely to remain high for some time." "The Board remains focused on ensuring that inflation does not become embedded once the impulse from higher oil prices has passed through. To achieve this, growth in demand needs to slow to reduce capacity pressures and help bring inflation back to target." "Oil prices have eased in recent weeks, although energy and most related commodity prices remain higher than they were prior to the conflict in the Middle East".
- RBA: Media Release 2026-19, 11 August 2026. https://www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/2026/mr-26-19.html. Held at 4.35 per cent, unanimously. "While the impact of the Middle East conflict on inflation has so far been less than expected, headline inflation is still too high." "This inflation impulse is in addition to the effect of capacity pressures in the economy."
- RBA: Governor's media conference, 5 May 2026. https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2026/mc-gov-2026-05-05.html. "Already we've seen a sharp increase in fuel and related commodity prices and this is already feeding through to inflation. The recent increases in interest rates will have no impact on this. What these increases do, however, is to help to contain the domestic inflationary pressures after the inflation due to oil and related commodity prices eases." "these interest rates rises are not going to do anything for inflation in the next six months. That's done and dusted." "The shock with oil prices, there's nothing we can do about that. And as I said earlier, the interest rate rises will not do anything about that. That is going to happen." "it's a real income shock for Australia and the world. Australians are poorer because of this shock to oil prices and energy prices and all the other commodity prices that are being impacted. We are poorer and there is no way out of that." "So we're not dealing - as I said earlier, the oil shock is not the sole reason why we are - we had an inflation problem before this. People often say to me, you must have a - well, you must have a better thing than the interest rate, we don't. It's all we have. And we know that it affects different people differently. We know that. But it's the only thing we have to address inflation." "So when we say we look through it, we can look through the initial impact. The indirect impact, if you like, on the costs of other businesses. And then we're looking for it to stop there. And any indications that it's not stopping there is the worry."
- RBA: Statement on Monetary Policy, May 2026, Overview. https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/smp/2026/may/overview.html. "In Australia, headline inflation increased to 4.6 per cent in March, with the higher fuel prices contributing 0.8 percentage points"; "3.5 per cent over the year to the March quarter, although it only captured one month of the conflict"; "There are indications that higher fuel prices are likely to have second-round effects on prices for goods and services more broadly."
- International Energy Agency: Oil Market Report, March 2026 (12 March 2026). https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-march-2026. "Oil prices have gyrated wildly since the United States and Israel launched joint air strikes on Iran on 28 February." Brent futures were "trading within a whisker of $120/bbl. Prices subsequently eased with Brent around $92/bbl at the time of writing". "With nearly 20 mb/d of crude and product exports currently disrupted" ... "we estimate that crude production is currently being curtailed by at least 8 mb/d, with a further 2 mb/d of condensates and NGLs shut in" (the position on 12 March, not the peak).
- U.S. Energy Information Administration: Today in Energy, 7 April 2026. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=67424. "particularly following military action in the Middle East on February 28 and the subsequent de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz". "After beginning the year at $61 per barrel (b), the front-month futures price of Brent crude oil finished the quarter at $118/b. The price increase during the quarter was the largest on an inflation-adjusted basis in data going back to 1988." The 25 days between the RBA's 3 February decision and 28 February are THE RORT's count.
- RBA: Media Release 2026-03, 3 February 2026. https://www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/2026/mr-26-03.html. The Board increased the cash rate target by 25 basis points to 3.85 per cent, unanimously. "it is evident that private demand is growing more quickly than expected, capacity pressures are greater than previously assessed and labour market conditions are a little tight". The statement does not mention the Middle East, oil, fuel, gas or energy (checked against the statement text).
- RBA: Statement on Monetary Policy, February 2026, Overview. https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/smp/2026/feb/overview.html. "Underlying inflation rose to 3.4 per cent over the year to the December quarter".
- Australian Bureau of Statistics: media release on the March 2026 CPI, 29 April 2026. https://www.abs.gov.au/media-centre/media-releases/cpi-rose-46-year-march-2026. "March CPI inflation of 4.6 per cent is up from the 3.7 per cent annual inflation to February". "Average prices for regular unleaded petrol rose 33 per cent"; "Diesel ... had a 41 per cent rise in average price"; "Housing, which is the highest weighted group in the CPI, was the largest contributor to annual inflation in March, with a rise of 6.5 per cent". Monthly trimmed mean was unchanged at 3.3 per cent.
- RBA: Minutes of the Monetary Policy Board, meeting of 4 and 5 May 2026. https://www.rba.gov.au/monetary-policy/rba-board-minutes/2026/2026-05-05.html. "These disruptions were estimated to have reduced the global supply of oil by around 10 per cent and LNG by around 20 per cent." "Even so, the real price of oil was still well below the levels it had reached on several prior occasions, including following Russia's invasion of Ukraine." "monetary policy could not prevent a near-term increase in the price level as higher fuel prices worked their way through to final prices. However, monetary policy could limit the risk that this cost shock resulted in a broader and sustained lift in inflationary pressure, by bringing aggregate demand into closer alignment with aggregate supply and ensuring medium- to longer term inflation expectations remained anchored." "monetary policy could not alter the near-term trajectory of inflation and, additionally, that output growth would likely be lower than potential growth for some time." "Members noted that several other central banks had chosen to hold their policy rates unchanged pending greater clarity on the likely effects of the conflict." "given monetary policy had already been tightened twice in 2026, waiting for a clearer assessment of how the conflict might affect economic activity could be an appropriate course of action." "one member placed more weight on the arguments for leaving the cash rate target unchanged, judging that capacity pressures prevailing before the conflict were somewhat less than the staff had assessed." "holding the cash rate target unchanged, while awaiting additional evidence on how the Australian economy would respond to the conflict, would best balance the risks to the Board's two objectives." "The member noted that this approach was consistent with that adopted by other central banks." "Most members also judged that an increase in the cash rate target at this meeting would best balance the Board's two objectives, accepting that the shorter term trade-off between these had worsened." The Minutes attribute no votes to named members; all nine members attended, including the Treasury Secretary as an ex officio member.
- U.S. Energy Information Administration: Short-Term Energy Outlook, 9 September 2026. https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/global_oil.php. "The Brent crude oil spot price increased to an average of $91 per barrel (b) in August, $7/b higher than in July"; partly on "the renewal of the U.S. blockade on Iran's oil exports"; "we forecast the Brent crude oil spot price will average around $90/b in the second half of 2026 (2H26)"; "decreasing to an average of $77/b by 2Q27". The second-half and 2Q27 figures are forecasts.
- Australian Government: Budget Paper No. 1, Statement 1, 12 May 2026. https://budget.gov.au/content/bp1/download/bp1_bs-1.docx. "Headline inflation rose to 4.6 per cent in the 12 months to March 2026, driven by a 32.8 per cent rise in automotive fuel prices in the month." "headline inflation is forecast to be 5 per cent through the year to the June quarter 2026".
- RBA: Statement on Monetary Policy, August 2026, Economic Conditions. https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/smp/2026/aug/economic-conditions.html; Overview https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/smp/2026/aug/overview.html. "we judge that conflict-related cost effects (excluding the direct effect of retail fuel prices) contributed a bit more than 0.1 percentage points to trimmed mean inflation in the June quarter. This was a little less than we expected in May, although this estimate is uncertain." "trimmed mean inflation remained high at 3.6 per cent over the year, only slightly below expectations, reflecting ongoing economy-wide capacity pressures and the pass-through of higher costs as a result of the Middle East conflict". "The June quarter outcome was substantially lower than the 4.8 per cent expected in the May Statement. This primarily reflected weaker-than-expected outcomes for automotive fuel and travel prices." "reflecting both global developments and lower retail margins for petrol". "Asian LNG prices and European natural gas prices have risen by around 20 and 18 per cent respectively, on restocking demand in Europe ahead of winter and concerns over future supply availability." No RBA figure for the direct fuel contribution to June-quarter headline inflation was found.
- Treasury: Final Budget Outcome 2025-26, Part 1, September 2026. https://archive.budget.gov.au/2025-26/fbo/download/00_fbo_2025-26.pdf. "Headline inflation was 3.9 per cent through the year to the June quarter 2026, materially lower than the forecast of 5 per cent in the 2026-27 Budget. This reflects lower-than-expected petrol prices, and subdued pass-through of broader cost pressures from the Middle East conflict to consumer prices."
- Australian Bureau of Statistics: Consumer Price Index, July 2026 (26 August 2026). https://www.abs.gov.au/media-centre/media-releases/cpi-rose-35-year-july-2026 and https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/price-indexes-and-inflation/consumer-price-index-australia/latest-release. "The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rose 3.5 per cent in the 12 months to July 2026, down from 3.8 per cent in the 12 months to June" ... "Trimmed mean annual inflation remained steady at 3.6 per cent". Table "CPI Tradables and Non-tradables components, annual movement (%)": "Feb-26 1.3 5.0 Mar-26 4.5 4.6 Apr-26 3.2 4.7 May-26 2.5 4.7 Jun-26 1.5 4.9 Jul-26 1.7 4.4". "Transport group (+1.6%) Over the past 12 months, the group rose 1.6%, up from a 0.1% rise in the 12 months to June 2026." The reading of that table in the text is THE RORT's.
- Australian Bureau of Statistics: "CPI rose 4.2% in the year to April 2026". https://www.abs.gov.au/media-centre/media-releases/cpi-rose-42-year-april-2026. "Automotive fuel prices fell 7.0 per cent from March to April, after rising by 32.8 per cent in the previous month. The fall this month includes the halving of the fuel excise on 1 April. Automotive fuel prices are still 23.5 per cent higher compared to February and before the impact of the Middle East conflict" ... "For example, Automotive fuel was excluded from the Trimmed mean in both March and April 2026." Fuel was up 18.6 per cent in the year to April and down 7.2 per cent annually in February 2026, before the war.
- Australian Bureau of Statistics: media release on the June 2026 CPI, 29 July 2026. https://www.abs.gov.au/media-centre/media-releases/cpi-rose-38-year-june-2026. "Lower world oil prices as a result of some stabilisation in the Middle East in June contributed to fuel prices falling 10.9 per cent in the month".
- Department of Industry, Science and Resources, Office of the Chief Economist: Resources and Energy Quarterly, June 2026. https://www.industry.gov.au/sites/default/files/2026-07/resources-and-energy-quarterly-june-2026.pdf. "Conflict in the Middle East has flipped LNG markets from expected oversupply to expected undersupply for the next 2-3 years." "LNG prices (Japan Korea Marker) are expected to reach over US$16/MMBtu in 2026, declining to a more normal level around US$11/MMBtu by 2028".
- RBA: Fireside Chat at CEDA, Governor Michele Bullock, Sydney, 22 September 2026. https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2026/sp-gov-2026-09-22.html. "these shocks to the supply side of the economy are very difficult for monetary policy to deal with. Monetary policy can deal with demand shocks ... But the supply side of the economy, when you get a supply shock, your trade-off worsens." "we have to be mindful that there will be first-round effects, but we need to be very careful to ensure that policy is set in a way that minimises the second-round and indirect effects which might perpetuate ongoing inflation"
- RBA: "Monetary Policy in an Era of Shocks", Governor Michele Bullock, Anika Foundation lunch, 28 July 2026. https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2026/sp-gov-2026-07-28.html. "A defining and recurring feature of the global economy in recent years has been the increasing frequency and impact of supply shocks." "Putting off a period of tight monetary policy today can mean higher rates and higher unemployment down the track." "a given increase in oil prices has a less direct and less pervasive effect on inflation today than it would have in the 1970s". "One thing monetary policy can't do, however, is address the economy's slow productivity growth. While this persists, the ability of the economy to grow without generating inflation is constrained, and Australians will continue to experience limited growth in real wages."
- Bank of England: Monetary Policy Summary and Minutes, February 2026 (5 February) and September 2026 (17 September). https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy-summary-and-minutes/2026/february-2026 and https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy-summary-and-minutes/2026/september-2026. Bank Rate held at 3.75 per cent at every 2026 meeting through September. February: the vote was 5 to 4 to maintain Bank Rate at 3.75 per cent, with four members voting to reduce Bank Rate by 0.25 percentage points, to 3.5 per cent. September: voted 6 to 3 to maintain, with three members voting to increase Bank Rate by 0.25 percentage points, to 4 per cent. September Minutes: "Monetary policy could not influence global energy prices, but was being set to ensure that the economic adjustment to them occurred in a way that achieved the 2% inflation target sustainably"; "Around 0.7 percentage points of the 1.1 percentage point overshoot relative to the 2% target was driven by the direct effects of energy prices, mostly motor fuels"; "Members continued to judge that weakness in economic activity and soft labour market conditions would help to contain the strength of second-round effects from higher energy prices". Brent and UK wholesale gas up 36 and 78 per cent since the July Report; CPI 3.1 per cent in August, projected about 3.75 per cent in the December quarter and slightly above 4 per cent in the March quarter 2027.
- RBA: Minutes of the Monetary Policy Board, meeting of 16 and 17 March 2026. https://www.rba.gov.au/monetary-policy/rba-board-minutes/2026/2026-03-17.html. "A minority of members judged that the case to leave monetary policy unchanged at the current meeting was the stronger one. These members reiterated that inflation was too high and that a further tightening in monetary policy would probably be required." "They also placed more weight on the weaker-than-expected consumption outcome and slowing in the growth in unit labour costs in the December quarter 2025" ... "they felt there was merit in delaying any tightening of monetary policy until the potential effects of the current conflict in the Middle East become clearer." "developments in the Middle East would further reduce the already constrained supply capacity of the Australian economy, increasing inflationary pressures for any given level of aggregate demand. Indeed, developments in the Middle East would add to global and domestic inflation under a wide range of scenarios" ... "if medium- and long-term inflation expectations increased, it would ultimately require significantly more contractionary monetary policy to achieve the Board's objectives." ... "These members also noted that the impact of the current conflict on the outlook for aggregate demand remains uncertain, given Australia's position as a net energy exporter and households' generally healthy balance sheets." "The conflict was likely to pose a material adverse supply shock to the global economy, though members agreed that the eventual scale and persistence of the shock was highly uncertain at the time of the meeting."
- RBA: "Understanding Supply Shocks and Their Implications for Monetary Policy", Assistant Governor Sarah Hunter, 8 July 2026. https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2026/sp-ag-2026-07-08.html. "This approach is only appropriate if policymakers are confident that the shock will not be persistent, that second-round effects will be limited and that inflation expectations will remain anchored." "When the economy is operating beyond its sustainable capacity, underlying inflation is above-target and we are on a steep part of the Phillips curve, firms may be more likely to pass on changes". A general framework, not a verdict on this shock.
- RBA: Opening Statement to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics, Governor Michele Bullock, 18 September 2026. https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2026/sp-gov-2026-09-18.html. "The increase in inflation partly reflects capacity pressures in the Australian economy, and the conflict in the Middle East has added to these inflation pressures." "central banks in many other advanced economies are responding to this global inflation shock by increasing their policy rates or signalling they will do so if needed." "many firms have passed input cost pressures arising from elevated fuel prices through to the prices of other goods and services." "labour market conditions remain close to, but a little tighter than, full employment." "Because monetary policy works with a lag, the full effects of recent rate increases are yet to be felt."
- RBA: Governor's media conference, 11 August 2026. https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2026/mc-gov-2026-08-11.html. "How do you react to these supply shocks? Do you look through them, or if they are occurring frequently and adding to inflation expectations ... then maybe you do have to react to them. And I think you've seen we have reacted firstly to the excess demand. We have also been reacting to what's been going on in the supply shock ... we have limited ability to completely ignore any future supply shocks."
- U.S. Federal Reserve: FOMC statements, 28 January, 18 March, 29 April, 17 June, 29 July and 16 September 2026. https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20260916a.htm and https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm. The target range was held at 3.50 to 3.75 per cent at every 2026 meeting through July (July vote 9 to 3, three members wanting a rise), then raised to 3.75 to 4.00 per cent on 16 September by a 12 to 0 vote: "The Committee decided to raise the target range for the federal funds rate by 1/4 percentage point to 3-3/4 to 4 percent". April: "Inflation is elevated, in part reflecting the recent increase in global energy prices". September: "While uncertainty remains elevated owing, in part, to geopolitical developments". Its April, June and July statements named energy and the Middle East conflict; the September text names only "geopolitical developments".
- European Central Bank: monetary policy decisions of 30 April, 11 June and 10 September 2026. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2026/html/ecb.mp260430~81b7179e6f.en.html, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2026/html/ecb.mp260611~4d41bd5e83.en.html and https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2026/html/ecb.mp260910~314e508016.en.html. Held in March, April and July; raised by 25 basis points in June (deposit rate 2.25 per cent, effective 17 June) and September (2.50 per cent, effective 16 September). 11 June: "The war in the Middle East is generating inflation pressures". 10 September: "increased to 2.50%, 2.65% and 2.90% respectively, with effect from 16 September 2026" and "The conflict in the Middle East continues to generate inflation pressures, and inflation is set to remain well above target for an extended period." September also cites Russia's war against Ukraine.
- Bank of Canada: press release, 2 September 2026. https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2026/09/fad-press-release-2026-09-02/; Statistics Canada, 14 September 2026, https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/260914/dq260914a-eng.htm; Bank of Canada CPI page, https://www.bankofcanada.ca/rates/price-indexes/cpi/ (fetched 29 September 2026). Held at 2.25 per cent, its seventh hold in a row. "The continuing conflict in the Middle East is keeping energy prices high" ... "So far, there has been little evidence of higher energy prices spreading to other components of inflation". Canada CPI 3.0 per cent in August (gasoline up 22.8 per cent); CPI-trim 1.9 and CPI-median 2.0.
- Bank of Japan: monetary policy decisions of 16 June and 18 September 2026. https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/mpmdeci/mpr_2026/k260616a.pdf and https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/mpmdeci/mpr_2026/k260918a.pdf; Statistics Bureau of Japan, 18 September 2026, https://www.stat.go.jp/data/cpi/sokuhou/tsuki/pdf/zenkoku.pdf. Raised to about 1.0 per cent on 16 June (7 to 1) and to about 1.25 per cent on 18 September (7 to 2). "the price pass-through stemming from the rise in crude oil prices has been progressing at a relatively fast pace in business-to-business transactions". "The Bank will encourage the uncollateralized overnight call rate to remain at around 1.25 percent." Japan's CPI was 1.9 per cent in August (1.7 per cent excluding fresh food), below 2 per cent "due to factors such as the effects of the government's measures to reduce the household burden of higher energy prices"; the energy index fell 0.7 per cent on a year.
- Norges Bank: Monetary policy meetings, May 2026 (7 May) and September 2026 (announced 24 September). https://www.norges-bank.no/en/topics/monetary-policy/Monetary-policy-meetings/2026/may-2026/ and https://www.norges-bank.no/en/topics/monetary-policy/Monetary-policy-meetings/2026/september-2026/. "the Committee decided to raise the policy rate from 4.25% to 4.50%". "Of course, Norges Bank cannot influence global prices, but that does not mean we can disregard them in the conduct of monetary policy. Increased energy prices and other commodity prices can spill over into domestic prices and contribute to keeping domestic inflation elevated." (from the May 2026 meeting page) Raised to 4.25 per cent on 6 May and 4.50 per cent (decided 23 September). In September the Bank said underlying inflation had slowed and was lower than projected.
- Sveriges Riksbank: press release, 24 September 2026. https://www.riksbank.se/en-gb/press-and-published/notices-and-press-releases/press-releases/2026/policy-rate-unchanged-at-16.75-per-cent. Policy rate unchanged at 1.75 per cent. "The supply shocks from the war in the Middle East remain and global cost pressures are still elevated" ... "If the outlook for inflation and economic activity remains unchanged, it is expected that the increases to the policy rate will begin this year". Swiss National Bank: press release, 24 September 2026, https://www.snb.ch/en/publications/communication/press-releases-restricted/pre_20260924. Held at 0 per cent. "Inflation rose slightly, from 0.6% in May to 0.8% in August." Earlier 2026 decisions of both banks were not checked.
- RBA: Minutes of the Monetary Policy Board, meeting of 16 June 2026. https://www.rba.gov.au/monetary-policy/rba-board-minutes/2026/2026-06-16.html. "Members noted that the European Central Bank and Norges Bank had both raised interest rates to contain the second-round effects of higher oil prices and address broader concerns about above-target inflation."
- U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics: Consumer Price Index, August 2026, 11 September 2026. https://www.bls.gov/news.release/cpi.nr0.htm. "The all items index rose 3.4 percent for the 12 months ending August as it did for the 12 months ending July." "The all items less food and energy index rose 2.4 percent over the year" ... "The energy index increased 16.3 percent for the 12 months ending August". Gasoline up 27.4 per cent.
- Eurostat: Euro indicators, flash and final HICP, 17 September 2026. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-euro-indicators/w/2-17092026-ap. "The euro area annual inflation rate was 3.2 % in August 2026 , up from 2.9% in July"; energy 14.3 per cent; excluding energy, food, alcohol and tobacco 2.4 per cent (2.5 in July). "The lowest annual rates were registered in Sweden (0.3%)".
- European Central Bank: "The ECB and Its Watchers", President Christine Lagarde, 25 March 2026. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2026/html/ecb.sp260325~ac2916a211.en.html. A speech, not a Governing Council decision. "First, if the energy shock is seen to be limited in size and short-lived, the classical prescription of looking through should apply" ... "Third, if we expect inflation to deviate significantly and persistently from target, the response must be appropriately forceful or persistent" ... "does not depend only on its origin" ... "but also on its magnitude and persistence" ... "pass-through is measurably stronger when capacity utilisation is high and unemployment is low"
- Stats NZ: Consumers price index, June 2026 quarter, 21 July 2026. https://www.stats.govt.nz/information-releases/consumers-price-index-june-2026-quarter/. "The consumers price index (CPI) increased 1.5 percent in the June 2026 quarter and 4.1 percent in the 12 months to June 2026." "petrol, up 27.5 percent (23.5 percent contribution to the 4.1 percent rise for all groups)". The Reserve Bank of New Zealand's 2026 decisions were not verified and are left out.
- International Monetary Fund: World Economic Outlook, April 2026, "Global Economy in the Shadow of War", Executive Summary. https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2026/april/english/execsum.pdf. "global growth is projected to be 3.1 percent in 2026 and 3.2 percent in 2027". In an adverse scenario growth slows to 2.5 per cent and inflation reaches 5.4 per cent; in a severe one growth is about 2 per cent and headline inflation just above 6 per cent by 2027. "Monetary policymakers should reserve the option to look through negative supply shocks" ... "as long as inflation expectations remain well anchored and the monetary policy stance is already properly calibrated".
- International Monetary Fund: World Economic Outlook Update, July 2026, "Global Economy in Crosscurrents of War and Technology". https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2026/update/july/english/text.pdf. "Where inflationary pressures are visible but judged to be temporary and inflation expectations remain anchored, central banks should keep real rates broadly constant over a reasonable horizon, which may imply raising nominal policy rates" ... "If higher inflation is paired with higher demand pressures from the technology-led upturn, central banks may need to do more to avoid overheating" ... "fiscal policy should avoid broad-based subsidies, tax cuts, and price controls". Growth 3.0 per cent in 2026 and 3.4 per cent in 2027.
- Bank for International Settlements: Annual Economic Report, 28 June 2026, press release. https://www.bis.org/press/p260628.htm. "policymakers must prioritise price stability". "Despite signs of easing geopolitical tensions and a significant drop in oil prices, the disruption's impact may linger." BIS Bulletin No 131, Banerjee, De Fiore, Lombardi and Lombardo, 5 August 2026 (staff views, not the BIS's), https://www.bis.org/publications/bulletin-131-energy-shocks-and-inflation-challenges-monetary-policy.pdf. "When expectations are above target, the inflationary impact of oil supply shocks can be more than twice as large as when they are well anchored" ... "an energy price surge combined with a loose fiscal position tends to be followed by higher inflation". The Bulletin also finds that prompt responses cost less where activity is resilient.
- Global Banking & Finance Review, citing Reuters: BIS urges central banks not to overreact to energy price spike, 16 March 2026. https://www.globalbankingandfinance.com/bis-urges-central-banks-overreact-energy-price-spike/. Hyun Song Shin, economic adviser at the Bank for International Settlements: "If it's a supply shock, and certainly if it's a temporary one, these are the textbook examples where you should look through and not react with monetary policy." "It really depends on how long the conflict lasts and how long the rise in the oil price will be sustained." Remarks reported via Reuters, not a BIS publication.
- RBA: Governor Philip Lowe, 22 November 2022. https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2022/sp-gov-2022-11-22.html. "bringing inflation back down again after it becomes ingrained in people's expectations is very costly and almost certainly involves a recession." "a rise in the unemployment rate of at least 5 percentage points."
- RBA: speech by Monetary Policy Board member Iain Ross, 22 September 2026. https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2026/sp-mpb-2026-09-22.html. "The overall thesis is that there is no evidence of the emergence of a wage-price spiral in the present circumstances and recent data suggest such an outcome is unlikely." "I am expressing my own views. I am not purporting to speak on behalf of the Monetary Policy Board or the RBA." One member's own views, not the Board's.
- RBA: Board meeting schedules, https://www.rba.gov.au/schedules-events/board-meeting-schedules.html ("The outcome of the meeting is announced at 2.30 pm on the second day."), and "Releases Expected", https://www.rba.gov.au/schedules-events/ (row "Minutes of Monetary Policy Meeting", 11.30 am, 13 October 2026; "The Minutes of the Monetary Policy Meeting are released two weeks after each Monetary Policy Board meeting."). Fetched 29 September 2026. Next decisions: Tuesday 3 November and Tuesday 8 December 2026, 2.30 pm.