What would fix it

Specific reforms that other jurisdictions use:

Revenue sharing: if traffic and toll revenue exceed the forecast on which the concession was based, government takes a share of the upside. Australia’s concessions capture the upside entirely for the private operator.

Mandatory price review: an independent tribunal reviews toll levels every five years and can order reductions if returns exceed an agreed threshold above the cost of capital. France’s autoroute system uses state-set annual toll increase limits that can be below CPI if the operator’s return has been sufficient.

Shorter concession terms: instead of 50-year concessions, 25-year terms with a mandatory renegotiation at the end. Shorter terms reduce the investor’s certainty of returns but also reduce the lock-in of users.

Competitive tender on lowest tolls: design tenders to reward bidders who commit to the lowest toll levels, not the highest upfront payment to government. The current model rewards maximising the sale price — which is achieved by maximising the net present value of future toll income.

The NSW Government review (2023–25) is examining some of these options. Implementation has not yet followed.

NSW has toll relief. The current scheme provides a 40 per cent rebate on NSW tolls above A$375 annual spending. It acknowledges the burden. It does not cap the toll or address the structural cause.

A more effective toll relief model would be means-tested, targeting households in the lower income quartiles who face the highest burden relative to income. The current scheme provides the same percentage rebate to a high-income earner using toll roads for convenience as to a low-income outer-suburban commuter with no alternative.

The NSW Government’s commitment to further toll relief is real. It is limited by the concession terms — the government cannot reduce tolls directly; it can only offset them through public funds. Every dollar of toll relief is a dollar the NSW Treasury pays to partly reverse the revenue stream flowing to Transurban.

The fix for the fuel price cycle has been available since 2001. It is called FuelWatch. Perth has it. Eastern states don’t.

A FuelWatch mandate for NSW, Victoria, Queensland and South Australia would require fuel retailers to submit their next-day prices to the government by a set time each day, with prices locked for 24 hours. Published prices would allow consumers to find the cheapest fuel in their area. The weekly cycle — which arises from the ability of retailers to change prices multiple times daily — could not operate under this regime.

The political barrier: fuel retailers have opposed mandatory price disclosure in eastern states. State governments have not pursued it. The ACCC has noted the FuelWatch model approvingly. It cannot mandate it — that requires a state government decision.

A second fuel reform: fuel tax credit reform. The over A$9.5 billion annual subsidy that reimburses mining and agricultural companies for the excise on off-road fuel use could be reduced for highly profitable extractive industries. The revenue could fund household fuel excise relief. This is a federal policy lever that has not been pulled.

The Australian Government chose to build Western Sydney International Airport as a publicly owned facility. This is the logical alternative to privatisation: government builds, government owns, government sets prices with a commercial return target that does not need to include a private equity premium.

The analogy is instructive. Every argument made for privatising WestConnex — private capital, private efficiency, risk transfer — can be made against Western Sydney Airport. The government chose otherwise. The result: an airport that will be owned by taxpayers, whose pricing can be set transparently, whose returns go to public purposes rather than to Transurban security holders.

For toll roads: the key question for future projects is whether they should follow the WestConnex model (private concession, 50-year monopoly, inflation-linked tolls) or the Western Sydney Airport model (government-owned, commercial pricing, public returns). The NSW pipeline — Western Harbour Tunnel, Beaches Link, M6 Stage 1 — has not resolved this question.

Some reform is underway.

NSW toll road review: the Minns government commissioned an independent review. Findings released 2024. Implementation ongoing.

Enhanced toll relief: NSW has expanded the scheme; further expansion promised.

Concession reform language: state government language around future concession design has shifted toward revenue sharing and shorter terms.

ACCC fuel monitoring extended: direction renewed for 5 years in December 2025. Monitoring continues, though without new enforcement powers.

What has not changed is the structural position: Transurban earned a 75 per cent EBITDA margin in FY25. Existing concessions run to 2060. Western Sydney motorists pay A$10.38 to use a road whose toll is contractually guaranteed to rise for another 34 years.

The political economy of toll road reform is the same as every other sector The Rort has covered. The benefits of reform are diffuse: millions of Australians paying slightly less for tolls and petrol. The costs of reform are concentrated: Transurban shareholders receiving smaller distributions, fuel retailers facing narrower margins.

Transurban is a political donor to both parties. The concession model has bipartisan support. The industry that manages the infrastructure investment funds that own Transurban is the same industry that manages the retirement savings of the workers who pay the tolls. The financial system is designed to align their interests over the long term. The problem is the short term: the daily toll, the weekly petrol cycle, the annual toll rise.

The reform agenda is clear. FuelWatch in the east. Revenue-sharing concessions for future roads. Independent toll price review every five years. Government ownership as the default for new projects. Enhanced and targeted toll relief now, as bridge to structural reform.

What it requires is a government that will act on it.