The political connections
Transurban is a documented political donor to both major parties. The NSW Premier who sold WestConnex was described by academic analysis as selling to ‘one of his party’s more generous donors.’ The CEO who oversaw Transurban’s expansion to network dominance subsequently became CEO of Sydney Airport. Infrastructure Australia — the body that recommends which projects get built — has board members with links to infrastructure investment funds. The concession agreements are commercially confidential. This is how private monopolies are built with public money.
In August 2018, NSW Treasurer Dominic Perrottet announced the sale of 51 per cent of WestConnex to a Transurban-led consortium for A$9.26 billion. He described it as a ‘very strong result.’ Academic analysis published in The Conversation described it differently: ‘the biggest misuse of public funds for corporate gain in Australia’s history.’ The Conversation analysis noted that Perrottet was selling to ‘one of his party’s more generous donors.’
Perrottet became NSW Premier in 2021. In the same year, the government sold the remaining 49 per cent of WestConnex to Transurban for A$11.1 billion. This was after the Berejiklian government had promised before the 2019 election not to privatise further assets. The promise was reversed.
WestConnex has bipartisan support. Both the Coalition and Labor backed the project at state and federal level. Both parties receive donations from Transurban. The privatisation model that produced a 75 per cent EBITDA margin for Transurban was not the product of one party’s ideology. It is the product of a political consensus that infrastructure privatisation is good policy — a consensus that both major parties share and that the infrastructure industry has systematically cultivated.
Both major parties receive Transurban donations. Both major parties supported WestConnex. The privatisation model has bipartisan consensus.
The donation architecture
Transurban is a registered political donor at both federal and state level. The Australian Electoral Commission publishes annual returns of donations above the disclosure threshold. Transurban and related entities appear in those returns. Both the Coalition parties and the ALP have received Transurban donations.
State disclosure registers are more relevant to toll road policy because concession agreements are state-level decisions. NSW, Victoria and Queensland each have their own electoral commission disclosure requirements. NSW has historically had lower disclosure thresholds than the federal AEC, providing more granular visibility of state-level donations.
The pattern visible across the disclosure records is consistent with the airline rort, the gas rort, and the airport rort: a regulated industry with government-granted monopolies donates to both major parties, maintains relationships across both sides of government, and ensures that neither party has a strong incentive to fundamentally reform the system that benefits it.
Infrastructure Australia: advisory to approval pipeline
Infrastructure Australia is the federal government’s independent infrastructure advisory body. It assesses major infrastructure projects, recommends funding priorities, and provides advice to government on what should be built. Its board includes current and former executives from infrastructure funds, construction companies, and state government agencies.
The structural problem with Infrastructure Australia’s governance is not corruption. It is institutional capture: the body that recommends which projects get built is staffed in part by people who represent or have recently represented the industries that build and finance those projects. A recommendation from Infrastructure Australia that a major road tunnel should be built is the first step in a process that ends with a Transurban concession.
Infrastructure Australia’s assessment of WestConnex was critical — it found the NSW Government had not adequately appraised alternatives. The project was built anyway. This is an example of what happens when the advisory process identifies problems but the political and financial incentives all point in the same direction.
The revolving door
Scott Charlton became Transurban CEO in 2012. Over the following decade, he oversaw the company’s transformation from a Melbourne toll road operator to the dominant toll road monopolist in three Australian cities. The defining transaction of his tenure was the WestConnex full acquisition.
In 2023, Charlton left Transurban to become CEO of Sydney Airport. Sydney Airport is another privatised infrastructure monopoly. Its owners include IFM Investors and Australian Retirement Trust — the same superannuation-affiliated infrastructure funds that own stakes in Transurban.
This is not corruption. Experienced infrastructure executives moving between privatised infrastructure monopolies is economically rational — their skills transfer directly. But it creates an institutional environment in which the people who run privatised infrastructure assets, advise governments on infrastructure policy, and manage the superannuation funds that own both have deeply aligned interests in maintaining the model that has produced 75 per cent EBITDA margins.
The concession terms: commercially confidential
The concession deeds that govern toll road privatisations in Australia are commercially sensitive documents. They are not fully public. The detailed terms — traffic guarantees, compensation mechanisms, competing road restrictions, toll escalation formulas beyond what is announced publicly — are protected as commercial-in-confidence.
This creates a fundamental asymmetry in public accountability. The taxpayers who funded WestConnex’s construction and the motorists who pay its tolls cannot fully scrutinise the terms under which those tolls will operate for the next 40 years. The Auditor-General’s 2014 review of early WestConnex processes found governance weaknesses in transparency. Those weaknesses were not remedied.
What is publicly known about WestConnex concession terms includes: the 4 per cent or CPI toll escalation floor until 2040, then CPI until 2060. What is not publicly known: the full suite of traffic guarantee mechanisms, competing route restrictions, and conditions under which the concession can be renegotiated.
The bipartisan consensus
The political connections story in the Roads Rort differs from the Gas Rort and the Airline Rort in one important respect: it is genuinely bipartisan, and it spans multiple decades and multiple governments.
WestConnex was a bipartisan project. The concession model has been applied by Labor and Coalition governments in NSW, Victoria and Queensland. Federal Labor and Federal Coalition have both provided grants and concessional loans to toll road projects. Neither party, in government, has fundamentally reformed the model.
The political economy explains why. Privatisation allows a government to record a large upfront receipt — popular in budget terms — while deferring the long-term cost (rising tolls) onto future users. The future users cannot vote against a decision made before the tolls started rising. The private operator earns above-market returns from the legal monopoly. The super funds that own the private operator earn infrastructure returns for their members. The road gets built.
The only losers in this equation are the motorists who pay tolls for the next 40 years. They are diffuse, numerous, and poorly organised. The beneficiaries are concentrated: Transurban shareholders, infrastructure fund managers, and the governments that got upfront cash.
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References & Sources
- [1] Wikipedia / Green Left — Transurban political donations.https://www.greenleft.org.au/2021/1320/news/westconnex-privatisation-highway-robbery-massive-scale— Transurban ‘a big political donor to both major parties.’ NSW sold A$13 billion in assets post-2019 after ‘no privatisation’ promise. WestConnex sale announced at COVID media conference to minimise political scrutiny.
- [2] AEC — Australian Electoral Commission federal donation records (current).https://www.aec.gov.au/parties_and_representatives/political_disclosures/— AEC publishes annual returns of political donations above the disclosure threshold. Transurban Group and related entities appear in federal AEC disclosures. Both Coalition parties and ALP have received donations.
- [3] Michael West Media — WestConnex sale political context.https://michaelwest.com.au/whither-the-westconnex-cash-berejiklian-buries-tracks-on-transurbans-11bn-toll-road-windfall/— WestConnex sale staged at COVID media conference. When second bidder dropped off, Transurban acquired both tranches unopposed. NSW Premier Berejiklian had promised no further privatisations before 2019 election. Promise reversed within term.
- [4] Infrastructure Australia — board composition and advisory role.https://www.infrastructureaustralia.gov.au/— Infrastructure Australia board members include current and former executives from infrastructure funds, construction companies, and state government agencies. IA assesses major projects and recommends priorities — creating a pathway for infrastructure industry participants to shape the projects that subsequently become concession opportunities.
- [5] Transurban — CEO Scott Charlton departure / Sydney Airport appointment.https://www.transurban.com/— Scott Charlton was Transurban CEO from 2012 to 2023. Charlton subsequently became CEO of Sydney Airport — another privatised infrastructure monopoly, also owned by superannuation funds.
- [6] The Conversation — WestConnex public investment analysis.https://theconversation.com/privatising-westconnex-is-the-biggest-waste-of-public-funds-for-corporate-gain-in-australian-history-102780— NSW Treasurer Perrottet described sale as ‘very strong result’ — the sale to ‘one of his party’s more generous donors.’ The academic analysis described it as ‘the biggest misuse of public funds for corporate gain in Australia’s history.’
- [7] NSW ICAC / Electoral Commission NSW — state disclosure records.https://www.elections.nsw.gov.au/— NSW has lower political donation disclosure thresholds than federal AEC. NSW Electoral Commission records show infrastructure industry donations to both major parties at state level.
- [8] Wikipedia — WestConnex bipartisan support.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WestConnex— ‘The project has bipartisan political support from the Coalition and Labor parties, at both a federal and state level.’ Infrastructure Australia criticised the NSW Government for inadequate appraisal of alternatives.
- [9] Crikey / independent analysis — infrastructure industry lobbying.https://www.crikey.com.au/— The Australian infrastructure industry is documented as one of the most politically connected industries in Australia. The revolving door between government infrastructure agencies, state treasuries, and private infrastructure operators is documented across multiple states.
- [10] Green Left — post-WestConnex network assessment.https://www.greenleft.org.au/2021/1320/news/westconnex-privatisation-highway-robbery-massive-scale— After WestConnex: ‘Transurban controlling all but three of Australia’s 21 toll road networks.’ Next projects in pipeline: Western Harbour Tunnel, Beaches Link, M6 Stage 1.
- [11] ACCC — toll road concession competition assessment.https://www.accc.gov.au/— ACCC cleared the Transurban WestConnex acquisitions without opposition, finding no substantial lessening of competition. ACCC’s framework focuses on direct competition between toll roads — less applicable when roads are geographic monopolies.
- [12] ANAO / Parliamentary inquiry — infrastructure procurement governance.https://www.anao.gov.au/— Common findings: inadequate cost-benefit analysis, optimistic traffic forecasts, insufficient transparency in commercial negotiations with preferred bidders.
- [13] Transport for NSW — concession terms documentation.https://www.transport.nsw.gov.au/— Concession deed terms are commercially sensitive and not fully public. Lack of full public disclosure limits public scrutiny of what has been traded away in exchange for private capital.
- [14] Infrastructure Australia — WestConnex business case critique.https://www.infrastructureaustralia.gov.au/— Infrastructure Australia found the NSW Government had not ‘adequately appraised alternative ways of meeting the project objectives.’ Road freight productivity could be improved by tolling existing roads rather than building new tunnels.
- [15] The Conversation — infrastructure privatisation political economy.https://theconversation.com/— Privatisation allows governments to recognise a large upfront cash receipt while deferring long-term cost onto future users. The academic literature consistently finds that privately operated monopoly infrastructure produces higher charges and higher profits than publicly operated equivalents.