The Qatar block

Qatar Airways' Senior Vice President, Fathi Atti, found out that his airline's application had been rejected by the Australian government the same way most Australians did: he read about it in the media. [1,12]

The decision had been made on 10 July 2023. ⁴ No notification was given to Qatar. No reasons were provided. ¹ A letter, dated 14 July, arrived ten days later, on 20 July. [1,12] The letter did not explain the decision. ¹

Qatar had applied to add 21 flights per week to its existing 28 weekly services, flights to Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth. [2,5] The additional flights were scheduled to start as early as February 2023. ¹⁴ Their approval was considered routine by the airline. [1,14] Qatar had maintained flights to Australia throughout the COVID pandemic, sometimes with as few as 20 passengers per flight, while Qantas was grounded. ²

None of that mattered. The application was rejected. No reasons were given. The man most likely to hold the answers, former Qantas CEO Alan Joyce, left Australia and never appeared before the inquiry established to investigate the decision. [8,9,10]

01What Qantas said, and what it also said

Qantas did not hide its opposition to Qatar's application. When the story broke, the airline confirmed it had lobbied the government against approval. ² Its stated reason: the extra flights would 'distort the market.' ²

In the same period, Qantas made a separate and contradictory admission: it would not be able to meet passenger demand on international routes for at least five years. [2,3]

The extra flights would distort the market, a market Qantas simultaneously acknowledged it could not adequately serve.

These two statements were made in parallel. The extra flights would distort the market, a market Qantas simultaneously acknowledged it could not adequately serve. [2,3] The route between Australia and Europe was operating at approximately 70 per cent of its pre-COVID capacity at the time of the decision. ³ The ACCI estimated that blocking Qatar's bid would cost the Australian economy between A$540 million and A$788 million every year. ³

02The decision and its justifications

Transport Minister Catherine King's public justifications shifted over the weeks following the announcement. [4,13] The formal statement was that the extra flights were 'not in Australia's national interest,' ⁵ a formulation so broad as to be unfalsifiable. ¹³

Then came the strip-search context. ⁴ In October 2020, more than a dozen female Australian passengers at Doha's Hamad International Airport were subjected to invasive examinations after a premature baby was found abandoned in an airport bathroom. ⁴ The incident had been widely reported and was the subject of ongoing litigation. ⁴

On 10 July 2023, the same day King made the decision to reject Qatar's flights, she signed a letter to the women affected by the Doha incident, writing: ⁴

King subsequently said the strip-search incident gave 'context' to her decision but was not the single reason for it. ⁴ Critics noted the timing: the letter was signed on the same day as the rejection, and the strip-search incident had occurred nearly three years earlier without preventing Qatar from operating 28 weekly flights. [4,13]

King maintained 'public interest immunity' to withhold the relevant documents, her communications with Qantas and her department's advice, from parliament. ⁸

She declined to appear before the committee. ¹³ She labelled the inquiry 'a political stunt.' ¹³

03The Acting Prime Minister was not consulted

On 10 July 2023, Anthony Albanese was travelling abroad. ² Richard Marles was Acting Prime Minister. ²

When Marles was asked whether he had been consulted before King made the decision, he confirmed he had not. ² He acknowledged being Acting PM on the day, adding that the decision was 'within the purview' of the transport ministry. ²

The decision to reject a major international airline's application, a decision subsequently estimated to cost the economy up to A$788 million per year, was made without consulting the Acting Prime Minister and without any stated reason being provided to the airline itself. [2,3]

04The Senate inquiry: a Joyce-shaped hole

The Senate established its inquiry into the Qatar decision in September 2023, after a motion from Nationals senator Bridget McKenzie passed by a single vote: 32 to 31. ⁶ The government and the Greens nearly stopped it from proceeding. ⁶

Over five weeks of hearings, the committee heard from Qatar Airways executives, aviation experts, competition economists, tourist industry representatives, airport operators, and Qantas's own chair and new CEO. ⁷ Virgin Australia CEO Jayne Hrdlicka told the inquiry that the government had changed its stance on Qatar's application only after Alan Joyce expressed his dissatisfaction. ⁶ Transport department officials confirmed that only Qantas and Virgin were consulted before the advice was sent to the Minister. ⁷

Former ACCC chair Allan Fels told the inquiry the situation was of 'unprecedented importance' in its impact on Australian consumers. ¹² He called for divestiture powers, the ability to force Qantas to sell Jetstar, as a structural remedy for the concentration in Australian aviation. ⁸

The one person who appeared unable to attend was Alan Joyce. He had stepped down as Qantas CEO in September 2023 and left Australia. ⁹ He said he was unable to appear due to 'personal obligations while overseas,' ⁹ noting that the committee could not compel him to appear while he was outside Australian jurisdiction. ⁹

He never fronted up. [9,10]

In February 2024, the Senate voted 30 to 28 against resuming the inquiry to hear Joyce and to follow up on Qantas's unsatisfactory answers to questions on notice. ¹⁰ The inquiry was formally closed. ¹⁰ Its key question, what exactly was said between Qantas and the minister's office before the decision, remains unanswered. [8,10]

The evidence supports the conclusion that the government rejected Qatar Airways' request because of interventions by former Qantas CEO Alan Joyce. Joyce never appeared before the committee. The motion to resume the inquiry to hear him was defeated 30 to 28. The key documents were withheld under public interest immunity. [7,8,9,10]

05The coda: Qatar arrived anyway

In February 2025, eighteen months after the block, Qatar Airways acquired a 25 per cent stake in Virgin Australia. ¹¹ The Foreign Investment Review Board approved the transaction on 27 February 2025. ¹¹ On 28 March 2025, the ACCC granted final authorisation for a five-year integrated alliance between the two airlines. ¹¹

Under the alliance, Virgin Australia commenced 28 weekly flights between Australia and Doha from June 2025, using Qatar Airways aircraft and crew under a wet-lease arrangement. ¹¹ Melbourne services followed in December 2025. ¹¹

The economic benefit cited for the alliance: an estimated A$3 billion over five years. ¹¹ The same A$3 billion figure Qatar had cited at the 2023 Senate inquiry when describing what the blocked flights would have contributed. ¹⁴

The competition arrived. It took a different route, equity stake and alliance rather than direct bilateral rights, and it arrived eighteen months late. [11,15] During those eighteen months, Australian consumers paid for flights on the Australia-Europe route without the competitive pressure Qatar's additional capacity would have provided. [3,11] The ACCI put that cost at up to A$788 million per year. ³

Qatar was blocked in July 2023. It arrived in June 2025, through a different door, via a 25% equity stake in Virgin Australia approved by the same government that blocked the flights. The competitive outcome Qantas lobbied to prevent arrived anyway. The delay cost Australians an estimated A$540 to A$788 million per year of foregone competition. [3,11,15]

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